I expect that any discussion even implying that overloading might be possible or acceptable, is “content to the forum that violates the law.”
So true. Every new pilot that I know gets a gift from me…“The Killing Zone” has some great data on what stage of flying is statistically the most dangerous and what the root cause of said accidents are. Spoiler alert…they are nearly controllable or highly influenced by the PIC/aircraft owner.
First of all, what’s “hot section”
Second, someone actually flagged this? Really?
Sorry, need to follow up because I did not read the comments following the statement in question.
I was not offended, as I have practiced Roman Catholicism all of my life. Maybe I have become “conditioned”, but whatever. I didn’t find it an “attacking” comment.
Sorry for the thread drift on a thread that was probably “gaslighting”
It’s a pretty good book but the statistics it cites are fundamentally flawed. The stats he used are accident frequency rather than rate. The main reason most accidents are in the “killing zone” of 50 to 350 hours is because most of the pilots have 50 to 350 hours! There are huge numbers of low-hour pilots, so of course they’re going to have more accidents numerically.
It has other qualities and its heart is in the right place, but the “zone” definition is statistically questionable at best.
Its not snowing in here is it?
Don’t look now but he joined…
Fair point…but regardless of rate vs. frequency the underlying causes are still overwhelmingly under our control/influence.
That said…is there data to even look at frequency to determine whether it’s a false premise? What if the data showed both that most accidents are with 50-350 hour pilots but also that the rate (accidents per x hours flown) is higher for pilots in that range. It seems intuitive that it would be.
-Sent from my iPhone
Ha! Splendid!
Hi Duane and welcome. You’ve come to the right place for Cirrus answers!
A G3 NA is a wonderful choice and I think your family will love it. If the airplane you choose has a UL of 1,000# as configured, it will provide a lot of utility without overloading, and almost all airplanes trade load in the tanks for load in the cabin - no big deal unless you make it one. Personally I’m against “over loading” and don’t particularly enjoy stressing about how much people or their luggage actually weighs so I stay away from the limit. I owned a G3 and it flies very differently with the aft CG you get with baggage and occupied back seats, so you’ll enjoy the airplane more if you just accept the fuel stop and stay conservative with W&B. We know the airplane will fly overweight but there a good reasons Cirrus had to say 3,400, and you know they would have loved to certify it heavier if they could have! I’m sure an engineer could provide the actual limiting factors, but brakes (aborted takeoff), chute capacity, and airframe strength come to mind. If you brief the chute every flight you’ll quickly realize the only truly dangerous scenario you cannot mitigate is EFATO, and a sprightly climb gets you to CAPS altitude reassuringly. No “sales guys” should advocate that even 100lbs won’t matter IMHO. But most of all, welcome!
Or perhaps not. In my experience, most relatively new pilots are aware that they are still learning the ropes and are less apt to push limits. Once someone has a few hundred hours they may feel more confident, but perhaps overly so. This is where the “I did XYZ several times and it wasn’t a problem so I can keep doing it” may kick in (normalization of deviance).
An Aviation Safety Magazine article seems to bear this out.
An Avemco study referenced in that article:
Avemco pointed out that taxi accident rates increased (to 13 percent) for pilots with more than 2500 hours total time. They ascribe this to complacency asserting that experienced pilots are likely to multitask while taxiing, thus increasing the chance for collision or excursion. …
The Avemco piece also noted another inverse relationship. “Pilots who have less than 50 hours in make and model have the lowest rate of taxi mishaps. They are probably not comfortable enough yet with the airplane to let their eyes and minds wander during taxi. The rate of taxi claims goes up when the pilot has 50 to 100 hours in make and model.” Avemco noted that “The pilot who logs more than 100 but less than 500 hours in type has a moderate but still fairly low rate of taxi claims. Log more than 500 hours in type, however, and you may fall into the trap of complacency and avionics distraction that causes the taxi loss rate to soar.
The article generally points to the 500-1000 hour “zone” as perhaps being more likely to brew up an accident, but the insurance industry is more interested in “time in type” as the indicator:
Based on writings and policies of the aviation insurance industry, pilot experience in a specific aircraft make and model is considered a better measure of competency than total flight time. Insurance underwriters can favorably rank a 1000-hour pilot with 500 hours in the make and model with a 10,000-hour pilot who has no make and model experience.
I think the insurance industry is in the best position to know risk factors, as that’s at the heart of their business.
That makes sense. To me I feel like my most dangerous period was 2-400 hours. I had enough experience to feel confident but not enough to have experienced situations that could put me at risk. There are also factors beyond time that play a role. For instance our general personality traits and risk tolerances. I remember the first time I picked up moderate ice and how quickly it happened. I’ve had a healthy fear of ice since then. Others may view it as “I was able to get out of it then so I could again”
I also recognize that as humans we are susceptible to many biases and agree that the objective data used to make a market or industry (like insurance as you mention) has the strongest incentives to be objective.
Ultimately it’s a complex, multi variate equation. Thinks like TIT and personality traits matter as well. Some of those are quantifiable and others not so much. Even if they were to book would be a much ‘meatier’ read and perhaps not as consumable to the average reader.
-Sent from my iPhone
As I have commented upon numerous times over the years, there is far too much focus on statistical numbers when it comes to the topic of safety or “danger”. Too many forget that statistics are nothing more then mathematical calculations. The behavior of humans creates a huge variable determinimg where on that statistical curve an individual will end up.
The number of hours flown is a perfect example. The so called “killing zone” is nothing more than another grouping of numbers. Just remember one simple fact about any of these numbers. Whatever the average outcome from compiled statistics, half the subject will be better than average and half will be worse. The range is very wide with these numbers. So what really determines who falls into the 50% profile and who is the outlier on the outer 2% of that bell curve? Fundamantally it is attitude.
If you know you are more vulnerable in the first 500 hours of your flying career, and you take mitigation techniques to deal with that statistical risk, you are less likely to have an accident than somone with twice your number of hours.
If the killing zone was so predictive of what will happen to all pilots under 5090 hours; half of us would not be here. There is a deeper reason why some pilots do not make it to 500 hours and other make it to 50 years of flying never having an incident or accident at all. The numbers only tell a small part of the real story.
Hi Duane,
1. Operating above MGW - Special Flight Permit:
If you join as a member, I’d be happy to include links to member posts concerning real world experience flying above MGW under Special Flight Permits. In short, it’s complicated, potentially dangerous, and requires significant planning in addition to necessary FAA authorization. It’s also scary.
I am not suggesting anyone fly above MGW. We are required to adhere to all section 2 limitations, including max gross weight. Exceeding the certificated limits is not a good idea - ever.
To answer your question, several professional pilots have shared their experiences flying under Special Flight Permits issued by the FAA (“ferry permit”) to allow overweight operation. They have received ferry permits to fly the SR22 at up to 130% of max gross weight. For a 3400 lb SR22, this would be 4,420 MGTW with the ferry tanks, etc.
The Special Flight Permit contains limitations necessary for safety of flight (speed/weather limits, not flying over people or congested areas, etc.). Obviously, it is not available for a routine flight just to put more butts in the seats. There needs to be a justification for it, such as an overwater flight. And the extra weight can only be due to fuel, fuel carrying facilities, and navigation equipment necessary for the flight. See 14 CFR 21.197(b).
2. Fuel Capacity vs Payload/Range:
The SR22 G3 increased total fuel capacity to 92 gallons usable and 60 gallons filled to tabs. So, for flights were you push up against MGW, you have the ability to easily trade some fuel to stay within W&B limits.
Even when filled to tabs, if you cruise lean of peak, you could flight plan for 3 hr legs and still have more than an hour of fuel reserve.
PS: The engineering changes incurred with the 200 lb gross weight increase in the G5 included a stronger wing spar and some changes to the fuselage. This is in addition to changes to the CAPS system. Cirrus also repeated aerodynamic flutter tests.