Marty,
In reply to:
I actually thought Trip Taylor’s response was hilarious, but then I have been told that I have an unusual sense of humor.
Indeed![:)]
But seriously, I think that Trip drew flak because he unfairly linked the pseudo-engineer’s nonsense post to a those thoughtful patriots who oppose the current administration.
Enough said.[:)] (And boy could I say more![:)])
In reply to:
… Being so poorly written, so unlike a trained engineer’s style with loose facts and scant detail, and hidden behind anonymity,
Indeed.
I was trying in my first post to hold a mirror up to the grade school level reasoning this “Avionics Engineer” presented as some sort of “Good Samaritan” whistle blower revelation.
This fellow’s posting lacks the most basic of engineering critique (in the sense of design analysis, not sanitary engineering, railroad engineering, stationary engineering and social engineering!).
Despite his laughable bravery under what he considers the cloak of internet anonymity, he fails to take advantage of the opportunity to provide specific details such as loading numbers pre/post G2, material or size substitutions etc that would provide even the tiniest indication that this guy is anything but a lowbrow buffoon.
My bet is that he somehow asked a question of someone and thinks that he has caught Cirrus in admitting they never tested the new G2 fuselage in an actual parachute deployment. He was likely under some kind of a delusional fantasy that he would be hailed as a hero. Instead he is lampooned as a babbling imbecile.
For the information of Mr. Engineer.
I don’t know how exactly Cirrus went about testing this new design (if the atttachment section of the fuselange is indeed any different?) but here’s what I’d do…
Using the thousands of multi-channel datapoints captured during the many MANY actual deployments of aircraft and 3400 lbs of water/sand (?) I would discover that the MAX deceleration load experienced during parachute deployment at full gross weight (3400) would say be (arbitrary educated guess here) 4 g’s.
4g’s x 3,400 lbs = 13,600 lbs.
Then, I would put an airframe (or even an airframe section) in what’s called an “iron bird” (or something like that) which is a big steel frame. Then I’d use a hydraulic winch/ram, sandbags or otherwise to put a 7 or eight ton load on the harness. Maybe I’d test it to failure or maybe I’d be satisfied at 20,000 lbs or whatever margin I wanted.
Then I’d document it all in case some crackpot like you started saying stupid things on the internet to start malicious rumours.
Then I’d ask COPA nicely if they would care to share the IP address you posted from, do a WHOIS search and find out who you are.
Then I would have my lawyers teach you a lesson and use your double wide trailer (oops, I meant to say manfactured home I got awarded… in my next forward impact crashwothiness test!
.
In reply to:
But seriously, I think that Trip drew flak because he unfairly linked the pseudo-engineer’s nonsense post to a those thoughtful patriots who oppose the current administration.
Any reference to previous politically charged threads was uninitended. Further, I deny any involvement with Mr Moore, Hallucinogens, the Dixie Chicks, Holiday Inn Express. If I am in trouble call Dennis H…Dennis …help!!!
I can sum up PilotDesign’s feelings toward the chute in one word - JEALOUSY.
Brian Fowler SR20 #1393
In reply to:
and I probably will vote for Bush again. There, take THAT Marty!
Taken![:)] And I did see “probably” in you statement.[:)]
In reply to:
Wasn’t there a Jeff? Are you still around Jeff?
Stephen,
I too miss Jeff and his helpful insider information. If I understand it correctly he has moved over to the competition and is now the WEB master for LOPA. [:)]
Walt
Robert,
Are you in research as a profession and what prompted you to do this non commercial research?
Brian Fowler #1393 SR20
Robert,
You might want to fix broken links on your website. You have used some “” in the links where you need “/”
Robert,
I’m glad you followed my suggestion to post! [;)]
In reply to:
Has anyone to your knowledge performed a simple test on the integral fuel tank of the Cirrus to insure that all hazardous quantities of water can be positively detected and eliminated during the preflight of the aircraft?
Since the SR20 and SR22 were certified under Part 23 of the FARs, then compliance with 23.971(b) must be demonstrated. It states " Each fuel tank must allow drainage of any hazardous quantity of water from any part of the tank to its sump with the airplane in the normal ground attitude."
When it comes to water in the fuel, an ounce of prevention is worth a gallon of sumping. Witnessing fueling from a quality source and maintaining your fuel caps properly are a good start.
-Mike
I am not a professional researcher in the sense that your question implies. My passion about this issue has led to my in-depth investigation which has been fueled (pardon the pun) by my findings. The support of other pilots, and even the resistance and inaction by the bureaucracy and those with a vested interest in keeping this information from the public has compelled me to continue my research.
Further, I am a pilot and aircraft owner and have always taken great pride in my skills as a pilot, and the meticulous condition of my aircraft. For seventeen years, during my preflight check, I found no water in my sump cup. I now look back on that time and the false sense of security I felt, and am astonished at the obvious revelation that the integral fuel tank was storing the water. This became all too clear when I subsequently experienced one rough running engine and three total in-flight engine failures. “Three strikes and you’re out” was not a reality for me, as it sadly has been for many other pilots who have not survived similar circumstances. It is in part because of that experience and those lives that have been lost that I felt compelled to try to better understand this problem, and to pursue a resolution.
As I began to explore this situation with a single letter to the FAA to enlist their help in correcting the problem, and a safety recommendation and petition to the NTSB, I was frustrated by the inaction and incompetence of those who are charged with oversight. Access to information was made difficult by FOIA denials, but fortunately through my website I have heard from pilots, aircraft owners and others who have shared their stories and provided contacts and information that is crucial to a complete understanding of this problem. My website Sumpthis.com serves as a repository for this information and provides a means to connect with others who have a need to know or information to share.
“Sumpthis” is a statement that while the design of the integral fuel tank may hide the water and endanger or sadly end the life of those who fly the planes with that design, the truth that has been discovered about the dangers of this situation will not be hidden.
Mike Radomsky asked me to post my question to the COPA forum, which I have done.
For all additional information regarding the well-known problem of water in the fuel tanks of general aviation aircraft refer to my non-commercial research only website.
Robert E. Scovill, Jr.
Martin,
Thank you for alerting me to broken links. This problem seems to occur with Mac users. The Mac browser throws the slant to the left. Might you be using a Mac?
Thanks,
Bob
Mike,
Prevention is good but positive detection is better.
The hype of prevention is useless if one cannot positively detect if prevention has occurred. Yet, for years, some pilots and aircraft owners as well as some NTSB investigators have sought an answer to the question of “Where did the contamination come from” without ever asking “Why was the
contamination not detected”? Topics in general aviation literature that emphasize prevention misdirect attention away from the more important safety issue of positive detection. Once airborne, when an engine failure occurs due to fuel contamination, it does not matter where the contamination came from or how it got in the fuel system. What matters are that during a preflight check the contamination was not detected. If it had been detected, the flight would not have been made without first performing a decontamination process followed by another preflight check. Prevention is important. It raises the question of “Where did the contamination come from”? And it places the burden of responsibility on a pilot or aircraft owner to exercise preventive measures. But it is “positive detection” that determines if prevention has occurred or not, a point that is rarely discussed in general aviation safety literature.
After one rough running engine and three total engine failures in flight in my Cessna 172P integral fuel tank equipped aircraft I question just how manufacturers comply with Part 23.971(b).
I think you will find that the manufacturers are not required by the FAA to do any real world testing on their fuel systems.
Of all I have learned during my quest for positive detection of water in the fuel tanks of aircraft, the most amazing thing from the president of an aircraft manufacturer was no testing is required.
If Cirrus has in fact completed such a test then they should be happy to demonstrate it for you while you watch. Any amount of water poured in must be positively detected and the same amount eliminated during the preflight of the aircraft. I challenged a Cirrus factory representative, Doug Whitson, Regional Sales Manager South, to perform such a test for me and his response was to lock the fuel caps and call one of the Cirrus engineers at the factory.
If you wish to confirm compliance to Part 23, 971(b) mix some red food dye and water and perform a test.
Richard,
I think we can agree that both prevention and detection of fuel contamination are vital for safe flight.
Part of the point of my earlier post was that modern aircraft are certified under the more stringent Part 23 regulations, while earlier aircraft (including, I believe, the Cessna 172P) were certified under CAR 3.
I must admit, though, that I haven’t seen the relevant section of CAR 3 to compare it to FAR 23. I also don’t know what kind of proof the FAA requires during FAR 23 certification that the requirements have been met.
As I’m sure you’re aware, Cessna added extra sumps to the 172R and 172S models in an attempt to solve the problem. The last time I counted, there were no fewer than 13 sump points!
As to Cirrus planes, you’ll need to talk to the factory about their demonstration of fuel contamination detection during certification. I’m not surprised that Doug did not know the answer. I can think of a dozen complex questions (and this is a complex question) that only an engineer could answer.
Also, it is my gut feeling that in many, if not most, cases of accidents caused by fuel contamination, they were not detected during the preflight because the fuel was not sumped! I’m sure that we’ve all seen pilots take off without a thorough preflight before the first flight of the day.
I’m not saying that undetectable contamination can not occur, I’m just questioning how common it really is.
I’d be interested to hear your additional thoughts on this, as well as any information you get from Cirrus.
Regards,
-Mike
Here is what the FAA had to say about Cessna integral fuel tanks and their 13 drains on the “new” (actually decades old engineering) production aircraft.
Memorandum
Subject:
Information: FAA Safety Recommendations 99.283 and 99.284
Date: March 10, 2000
From:
Associate ACO, Manager Airframe and Services ACE-118W
Reply to J. D. Janusz
Attn. of:
316-946-4148
To:
Manager, Recommendation & Quality Assurance Division, AAI-200
We have completed our review of the subject recommendations. The subject recommendations cited an example of a Cessna Model 172P that had experienced one incident of a rough running engine and 3 separate in-flight shutdowns, which resulted in forced landings. This particular airplane was equipped with the original standard single wing fuel drain, located in the aft inboard section of each integral wing fuel tank (1 LH & 1 RH). Following the second in-flight shutdown, this operator had Cessna Service Kit SK182-100 installed, which added 4 additional drains at various locations throughout each integral wing tank. The operator experienced an additional in-flight engine shutdown following the kit installation, and has since determined his airplane to be unairworthy, and identifies it as such.
At this time the Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) has determined the following:
Safety recommendation 99.283: We have reviewed the water/contamination egress capability of the Cessna model 172P, and find that it is not adequate. Our findings indicate that this operator’s airplane was designed and manufactured in such a manner as to not provide adequate water/contamination egress capability. Based on our review, we have determined that other Cessna high wing airplanes use a similar design and construction method for their integral wing fuel tanks. Therefore, we believe this condition may exist on other integral fuel tank equipped Cessna high wing airplanes with gravity feed fuel systems.
Safety recommendation 99.284: We have reviewed the effectiveness of Cessna Service Kit SK 182 -100 and found that it is not adequate to perform it’s intended function of assisting in the detection and removal of water and/or contaminants in the integral wing fuel tanks when the airplane is in a normal ground attitude.
Based on our findings, the Wichita ACO will take the following action with Cessna
Aircraft Co:
Advise them we have determined their design does not comply with the requirements of CAR 3.444 for the model 172P, when equipped with integral fuel tanks.
Advise them we have identified an unsafe condition, which exists on the model 172P aircraft equipped with integral fuel tanks, and that this condition is likely to exist on other airplanes of the same type design.
Advise them that we will be taking Airworthiness Directive action based on the above findings.
Advise them the Administrator has determined that design changes are necessary to correct the unsafe condition, and requests their submittal of appropriate design changes for FAA approval within 30 days.
Advise them we believe this condition may exist on all Cessna high wing integral fuel tank equipped airplanes, and request their identification of applicable models and serial numbers and submittal of appropriate design changes for each model for FAA approval within 60 days.
Advise them that we will be making a Specific Finding to the requirements of 14 CFR part 23.971 on the current Model 182T and T182 programs.
Advise them we will request a full review of compliance substantiation for the model 172, 182 and 206 series airplanes manufactured since the restart of production (type certificated since 1996), with respect to the requirements of 14 CFR part 23.971.
Take any other action deemed appropriate based on the above actions.
We thank you for bringing this situation to our attention and trust that our action plan is considered sufficient to close the subject safety recommendations.
If you have any questions or need additional information regarding these issues, please contact Mr. Jeff Janusz, ACE-116W at (316) 946-4148.
David Ostrodlea
For
Ronald K. Rathgeber
Home Documents Images Message Board
(Use your browser’s back button to return to the page that you were previously viewing.)
Regards,
Robert E. Scovill, Jr.
http://sumpthis.com/
Robert: I am befuddled (not something new or especially unusual for me) about the basic question:
In reply to:
Has anyone to your knowledge performed a simple test on the integral fuel tank of the Cirrus to insure that all hazardous quantities of water can be positively detected and eliminated during the preflight of the aircraft?
and your ardent follow-up. It has already been explained that the current CAR 23 (7?) standard
In reply to:
Since the SR20 and SR22 were certified under Part 23 of the FARs, then compliance with 23.971(b) must be demonstrated. It states " Each fuel tank must allow drainage of any hazardous quantity of water from any part of the tank to its sump with the airplane in the normal ground attitude."
to which the Cirrus aircraft were certified have specific requirements about being able to sump fuel. I donÂ’t think anyone on this Forum has the FAA certification experience or the inside knowledge of Cirrus Aircraft to intelligently discuss how those particular segments of the regs were complied with and verified to the satisfaction of the FAA.
Your post, appearing under “PilotDesign2003’s original post titled, “Cirrus SR22/G NOT SAFE!!” certainly appears to be an accusation camouflaged as a question. That original post went on to say,
In reply to:
I have been reluctant to submit this post but feel every owner of the new Cirrus SR-22 G Model should be very weary of accepting this aircraft UNTIL CIRRUS design admits they have lied to its customers, and redesign the parachute deployment system on this plane
I am an engineer, and in the process of researching this aircraft have found out that CIRRUS HAS NEVER TESTED THE PARACHUTE SYSTEM in these aircraft! This is very important because Cirrus engineers have redesigned the brackets that hold the parachute system for the new SR-22 G. !
When asked about his background, experience and other specifics of his accusation, the poster was silent. When given credible responses, the poster neither accepted nor confronted these replies. Adding your post to this thread, keeping the subject line the same, only predisposes the readers to discount the possibly very bona fide concern that you raise. Is this not the exact opposite reaction you desire?
People on this forum are intensely interested about the safety of their aircraft after all, they are the ones that fly these planes and use them to carry their friends and families as passengers. Conversely, these same readers are weary of individuals with veiled or disguised identities posting wild and unsupported accusations or innuendo. More often than not, these are posted without anything to support the posterÂ’s credibility such as credentials, a valid email address or an ongoing dialogue which supports the original thesis. With nothing more to fall back upon, COPA’s member and readers most often attribute this style of post to be a troll, either trying to stir up some excitement or as a baseless and wanton attack on Cirrus Design.
At least one person has asked you questions about your investigation,
In reply to:
I’d be interested to hear your additional thoughts on this, as well as any information you get from Cirrus.
to which I do not recall seeing any direct response. From you logon ID and web site, it appears that you have a real and honest interest in the hazards related to sumping of the fuel tank in aircraft. Please share more of your background, results of prior investigations and motivation for pressing this issue and what responses you have had when directing your questions to the organizations such as the FAA or Cirrus Design themselves.
(BTW: Several students, who were completing research papers, have used this forum to inquire about the issue that they are studying. To the best of my recollection, these queries were met with open and forthright responses and followed up with a dialogue where many sides were discussed.)
I am sorry that maybe I missed something on this thread. But where is the suggestion or the issue that Cirrus has a problem with water that cannot be drained from the fuel tanks?
I understand the concern, in general, when one has had an engine failure due to water in the tanks. But I am not aware of Cirrus having a problem with this. The airplane has “wet wings”, not bladder tanks. Cessna has a long history of water problems with bladder tanks.
I still do not get the Cirrus association here1 Help?
In reply to:
This problem seems to occur with Mac users. The Mac browser throws the slant to the left. Might you be using a Mac?
Is not a Mac thing, but rather a windoze thing (Macs and their browsers are using the web standards). windoze, an modernized MS-DOS, uses "" for directory and filename separators. Thus a windoze machine might accept your "" but no other operating system should. For example, Unix does not. See http://www.w3.org/ for web standards.
In reply to:
Is not a Mac thing, but rather a windoze thing (Macs and their browsers are using the web standards). windoze, an modernized MS-DOS, uses "" for directory and filename separators. Thus a windoze machine might accept your "" but no other operating system should. For example, Unix does not. See http://www.w3.org/ for web standards.
Say what you will about the President, U.S. Policy, the TSA, unscrupulous attorneys, lecherous doctors, lazy pilots, bad avionic designers, sloppy software, Cirrus fuel tanks, political correctness, web site censorship, pooper scooper laws, and zoning standards to eliminate honest hard working strippers (oops, sorry I digressed!), that is all fair game. BUT WATCH WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT MACS! Defamation of Macs is not tolerated on this forum, and the “Mac Police” will prosecute you to the fullest extent possible![;)]
Marty,
That’s why I asked the question about his profession which he never responded. I was curious as to whether this was another troll or not. By the way, I changed the subject line back to “Sump This.” Doesn’t make sense to piggyback onto BRS posting.
Brian Fowler SR20 #1393