Tomasz,
Welcome to COPA online, albeit in these very tragic circumstances. I am sure everyone here would extend their condolences to you on the loss of your friend and fellow Cirrus pilot, and to others affected by this accident. Thank you for your post. Please, let us know more when you can, and extend best wishes for a full recovery to those you visit in hospital.
Tomasz;
On behave of all COPA members, let me offer condolences to the loss of your friend. VERY tragic! Thanks for your contributions here. By sharing accurate information with us you can perhaps help another pilot not suffer the same fate. Your friend’s legacy will live on with the lesson he teaches all of us. Let us know what else you find out.
Tomasz, please know that the COPA community expresses our condolences to the family and you for your friend’s loss. May we learn from these tragedies.
Over on the COPA member’s forum side, I have begun posting additional news reports and information from the Swiss accident board with their initial report. They state that the pilot diverted due to an alternator failure.
Cheers
Rick
Welcome, John. And as a frequent poster about Cirrus accidents, let me congratulate you on scooping me with an extraordinary useful post on the chain of accident decisions. Well done.
Also, we are beginning to see the accident investigators use more stored information from the avionics to reconstruct the accident flight profiles. This airplane was severely damaged but unburnt. It is old enough not to have a flight data logger, but new enough to have a PFD. I hope that the investigators can extract useful data.
Cirrus Design revised its materials for first responders. I have a copy of the DVD and will soon post an update on the COPA Safety Blog “Pull early, pull often!” on this site.
For now, anyone who discovers first responders who have not yet had training from Cirrus Design to please call the Air Safety Hotline at 800-279- 4322 (USA) or 952.988.1940 (International).
Cheers
Rick
Below the first official report (BFU Berne) what caused the accident (sorry only in german)
Im Reiseflug verlangte der Pilot um 15:33 LT bei der
Flugverkehrsleitstelle eine Landung in Zürich. Als Grund
für diese Ausweichlandung gab er den Ausfall eines
Alternators an. Während des Anfluges auf Piste 14 des
Flughafens Zürich traten nach Angaben des Piloten
weitere Probleme auf. Die Maschine befand sich
schliesslich westlich der Piste 14 und führte eine
Linkskurve und anschliessend eine Rechtskurve in
geringer Höhe über Grund aus. Dieses Manöver brachte
das Flugzeug nördlich des Pistenkopfes 14, wo es mit
Querlage nach rechts auf dem Boden aufschlug.
Very rough English translation
At 1533 local time while en route, the pilot asked to land at Zurich. He gave as the reason for this deviation a failure of an alternator. During the approach to runway 14 at the Zurich airport the pilot advised that he encountered further problems. The aircraft eventually ended up west of runway 14 where it banked first left then right at low altitude over the ground. This maneuver brought the aircraft north of the threshold of 14 where it struck the ground crossways (to the runway).
Sorry for the rough translation. Been out of school a long time.
We are, of course, a long way from putting all the pieces of this tragic puzzle together but we already have important food for thought especially with regard to decision making. I don’t for a minute mean to criticize the pilot in this accident. On the contrary, from what I understand so far I can see myself doing as he did in this situation. I have flown some in the area around Zurich though I have never flown an approach to the airport in IMC and with an alternator failure.
What I recall is that because of the geography of the Zurich area any approach to RWY 14 is likely going to be over the lake, a much better proposition than having to negotiate the very tall mountains nearby.
For me that would have been a factor that would go into the plus column as I am considering my options. North of the lake the terrain is much lower than in any of the other quadrants but Zurich is the nearest airport with the best facilities. I’m not sure how far I would have to fly to find anything nearly so good. I know how I felt when flying into a nearby airport last winter. My destination was Sion which lies in a narrow valley and into which one cannot fly an instrument approach unless qualified to do so at that airport. Descending through cloud to VMC so I could make my way through the valleys up to the airport I was comforted by the knowledge that I was descending over the lake. So I have a sense of what the pilot might have been feeling. Adding some of the elements together - descending over the lake with less likelihood of CFIT, the fact the pilot announced he had ground contact, a big airport with long runways - all these elements combine in a positive way and persuade me that in the same situation I would have been asking for an approach into Zurich too, provided there was not VMC reasonably close.
Yet, a tragedy occurred.
There is much for me to learn from this.
Details really help as well as an adequate translation. Based on the above, Timm, the so called “power failure” now seems to be an alternator and not an engine failure. That makes a lot more sense in the discussion. I presume this was an Alt 1 failure which would have kept him “busy” in IMC.
So if he announced alternator failure at 15:33 local; how much more time was it when he was on final approach and said that he had “Power Failure” and No Glide Slope? Is it possible, that he lost all of his navigation capabilities when the battery ran down? We don’t know yet what load shedding he did. Hopefully they might be able to find if CB and power knobs were put in OFF.
Do we know if when he diverted; he declared emergency?
I could not tell that Approach Control had any idea he was having problems and asking to stay fast while getting him to the airport quicker, made things speed in the decision cycle.
Thanks to all that are helping us understand more what went on.
So sorry for the loss to the families and friends.
I´m just speculating now, but from the translation, it seems to me that the pilot lost control in the very last moments of the flight while tring to bring back and align the plane safely to the runway 14. It could be a stall at low altitude or a CFIT (scraping a wing tip to the ground). We had an accident in Brazil, at Gurupi, with a SR22 that scraped a wing tip and crashed while very low and turning from a extremely short base to final in very heavy rain in a VFR only airport.
I´m really sorry for the victim and their families.
Let´s be careful up there!!
The scenario you describe does seem plausible but I would hate to draw any conclusions at this stage.
So many elements will need to be pulled together and verified in order to get a clear picture of what happened. At this point there are just many questions in my mind.
We have now some facts which are certain :
the pilot first declared an alternator failure, not an engine failure
due to this failure he diverted to Zurich in strong IFR weather
he declared an electrical power failure during final approach with lost of glide slope signal
he was on the right side of the localizer and above the glide around 3 NM from threshold
he tried to join the runway and land with visual contact to ground but without visual contact to the runway
he lost the control over the airfield trying to join the runway and performing unusual maneuvers
On the contrary we do not know which alternator has failed first and what exactely occured during final : complete lost of electrical power with lost of primary navigation system ?
In spite of the sadness and the sorrow provoked by this accident we have to try to understand :
the critical decison making in that case because the pilot was trained, calm and efficient and we fly the same aircraft.
the succession of events and failures which have lead to the accident
What I remember from this tragic accident is :
always declare an emergency in IFR in case of electrical issue in a Cirrus : ATC will give you prirority for landing and all the help that you deserve in that situation
any electical failure in an “all electrical” aircraft is a very hazardous situation, even if the electrical system has redundancy
In case of total electrical failure (alt1 + alt2) the only electrical source onboard are the batteries N° 1 and 2.
If they are brand new and fully loaded you have 20 min juce on Batt 1 and 20 min on batt 2 at normal load. So remember to fly IFR with batteries in good shape.
a lot of sequential failure of both alternators in less that 10 mn have been reported in this forum (here and here for example) : even if you show an alt 2 failure, keep in mind that it could be shortly followed by an alt 1 failure or vice versa…
if you encounter an alt1 failure during cruise, switch off batt 1, pull off the breakers of all the devices that will be unuseful during the approach ( MFD, strobes, stormscope, skywatch etc…) in order to save your batt 1 to feed essential devices during your final approach. Read and read again this post in COPApedia.
Pilots operating Cirri with a PFD have to think about their decisions in case of PFD failure in heavy IFR conditions : be prepared to a very bad situation because there are just a few GPS procedures and no precision GPS approach in Europe and in that case you do not have ILS onboard.
My thoughts and condolences to the families.
Brian,
I agree. Alternator failure, no engine problems, no icing. And way too high in the final phase before landing. And probably no visual contact with the runway until very late, when he started correcting.
Very sad.
Timm
See the Pull early, pull often! blog post Cirrus Design Advisory DVD for First Responders. It describes the updated materials left behind after training first responders.
See the COPA Safety media gallery for the Advisory Guide for First Responders.
Cheers
Rick
Timm, from one of the news reports, they published this photograph of the crash scene soon after the event. Note the low visibility towards the hills beyond.
This was soon after the event because later pictures show a tent erected over the aircraft wreckage and somewhat clearer visibility.
Also you can see the approach lighting. Do you know where this was located on the airport?
Cheers
Rick
Rick,
No doubt there were bad factors leading to the accident :
an alternator failure
a very busy airport with overloaded ATC and radio frequency
high mountains around the airport
a very bad weather : METAR at 15:50 LT (the accident occurred at 15:58 LT) LSZH 221350Z 31008KT 3000 -DZ FEW003 SCT007 BKN014 08/07 Q1021 NOSIG
a very hight speed on approach (160 kt) inducing a very high rate of descent (800 ft/mn)
a non stabilized approach
no missed approach with full deflexion of glide slope and no visual contact with runway environment
However Zurich was a good choise to divert (a big well equipped airfield) with IFR weather minima to land. And if you have an electrical failure and visual contact with the ground it could be a very strong tentation to continue trying a VFR approach.
The only issue is why to accept such a high speed for the approach, why not declare an emergency to get rid of the other heavy traffics behind you?
Rick,
yes, I have at least an idea where approximately the accident was. Go to Google Earth, search for LSZH. You’ll see the airport from above. Rwy 14 is the northernmost of the 3 runways. Zoom in to the approach end, until you can read 14 on the runway, then tilt the view. You can see the approach lights, the fences and the trees in Google Earth quite well. The report says that the airplane did the aligning turns west of the runway, then crashed north of the approach end.
I would assume that the reporter who took the photo was outside the airport fence; that’s why you see a fence in front and one in the distance. Probably a very long tele shot, magnifying the fog.
I’m under the impression that the airplane cartwheeled - see no impact in the grass left of the plane, but parts and impact on the right side of the picture.
Timm
Excellent directions. Here is what I got.
I also noticed another photograph that I used to match this location. It was taken at 15:58 LT according to the ExIF info with the photo. By that time, the visibility had improved greatly from 3000 to 6000 (whatever units are used in the METARs that were posted earlier).
Excellent conjecture. Here is a close up photograph of the damage.
Notice the fuselage is broken and crumpled very badly. The roof of the cockpit is shifted completely over the rear baggage window. Also, your cartwheel suggestion matches the extraordinary damage to the left wing, with only a small bit of composite hanging onto the wing spar and the remainder of the outboard section broken off and touching the ground. Further evidence that impact forces can be extraordinary if this was a low-altitude stall/spin accident, since the last reported altitude was about 3400 feet MSL and the runway elevation was 1406 feet.
This is a tragic end to a troubling flight.
Cheers
Rick
Oops! Meant to post the Google Earth link. Click on attachment link above.
Cheers
Rick
/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Components.UserFiles/00.00.00.22.56.attachments/Fatal_2D00_42_2D00_Zurich-near-runway-14.kmz
Hi all,
I am flying anSR22 N589CD in Europe, and commute between belgium and Zurich (LSZH) several times a month, thats why I know the approach on the 14 quite well.
Some thoughts from my side :
-I do not understand that if there was a kind of problem, he did not mention that earlier to the tower. Zurich ATC is known to be extremely flexible to small GA planes,eventhough it is a very busy field. ATC are very accommodating for any kind of problem; They once sent 1 airliner in a go around on the 14, as I wanted to return from a VEBIT2W departure to the 14 as I picked up lots of ice…I am pretty sure they would have vectored him straight to the 14 threshold immediately.
-Neither do I understand that he accepted the usual very long vectoring for a downwind on the 14; Basically after GIPOL, they give you a direction of 070, which happend to him as well, and then the left turn for the long downwind; This allows ATC to space all incoming aircraft. They vector you sometimes 15 to 20 miles out on this downwind; I did not measure correctly the time he flew out on this downwind but it must have been at least 5 minutes (at this speed, thats at least 24 miles extra in BOTH ways). If time became a critical factor, I do not understand why he let this happen.
-I guess he lost the PFD, as localiser and glideslope were gone apparently. But still, as the radio was working, I think he had the localiser on the GARMIN 1 or 2, of course no glideslope.
-There is a “DME” reading on this ILS 14, which was readable through his Garmin, in case the PFD was gone. That could have give him the correct distance to the threshold.
Of course I agree, we only probably figure out part of the facts, and after wards it is always easier…
My thoughts are with their families in the first place.
Regards,
Jos
