Yep, that’s me! But most people here already know that.
I appreciate your posting my pedigree (ainÂ’t search engines great?); however, I’d hope my arguments would stand on their own merit.
In reply to:
Thanks for the support, but thatÂ’s not quite what IÂ’m saying (though I agree itÂ’s hard to argue with). What IÂ’m saying is that the PFD ought not to give the illusion of flying into clear air (i.e., the photorealistic impression of a terrain-free, VMC day) unless it does provide terrain info. Since the Cirrus PDF doesnÂ’t provide terrain info, then it shouldnÂ’t look like it might, however subtlety or subliminally. My recommendation would be to simply remove the shading. That way youÂ’d still get plenty of attitude info without the illusion of looking out a real windshield at the real world.
I see your point; perhaps a black color, and perhaps with a ‘no terrain info’ note.
However, I expect/hope that Cirrus, with it’s history of proactive and innovative pursuit of safety, will/should aim higher; required TAWS, and something like brown for terrain clear, red for a terrain conflict, or black if no TAWS info is available. Especially given the Cali report note re pilots fixating on a single display under stress.
In reply to:
Probably the most widespread finding [according to the Cali accident investigation] is that under various forms of stress, people tend to narrow their field of attention to include only a limited number of central aspects.
Bravo! Precisely! And whatÂ’s the most central instrument when youÂ’re stressed? The attitude portion of the PFD! ThatÂ’s why I think itÂ’s so important that the PFD be clear in what it is (and isnÂ’t!) saying.
How about this in rebuttal:
If they hadn’t had the FMS and GPWS, the pilot and navigator would have been a lot more alert to where they were at any given time and therefore said “hey, that turn will aim us right at the mountain side. Something is wrong here, don’t do that!”
I know from 1st-hand conversations that airline crews don’t actively use charts to follow their progress at low altitude. They rely 100% on what ATC and / or the nav boxes tell them to do because they are ALWAYS on IFR flight plans. A low level ATC radar outage is automatically an emergency for them because they don’t have any high resolution situation awareness, even on VFR days. THAT is why the FAA lobbies so hard for GWPS and TAWS. Its easier to put another box in the plane than to convince the crusty old PICs to remember to navigate. Technology is seen as the fix to human error when training away the human error is actually the correct fix.
Being worried (scared) that they were going to end up off course and hit something like cumulo-granite or those old HUGE radio masts is why old aviators spent entire flights working and re-working navigation problems. They managed to fly across oceans, through mountain passes, and do low-level bombing runs on enemy territory, then reverse the entire process using just a sextant, clock, flight computer and paper charts. Later on they added crude radio homing ability because some got lost. Only rarely did they manage to run into stationary objects with a perfectly good airplane. My point is that more pilot training in the use of raw position data (NBD, GPS, VOR) and constantly updating position, altitude, heading, time-to-next-fix, etc on real sectional charts is needed. Even if you’re on an IFR flight plan, knowing where you are relative to the ground without relying on the TV screen in front of you will always keep you away from CFIT.
GPWS, TAWS, ADS-B, etcetera are really cool gadgets. They do help with situational awareness. What would actually fix the problem would be to change the PTS for all certificates. The practical test should include a long cross-country flight with the examiner. At any point in the flight, if the candidate can not point out where the plane is, within +/ 0.2 nm laterally, on a VFR sectional chart, WITHOUT FIRST CROSS-CHECKING some electronic device, then the student fails the test right then and there. For private pilots, this would require the student to constantly split attention between flying and ground reference / DR position plotting. For instrument, commercial, ATP, etc. students, this would require the student to use the raw instrument data to fix a position, then plot it, constantly.
A new task for TAA instrument certification: The examiner, without prior notice, will fail all on-board graphic navigation instrument displays (including multifunction and primary flight displays) and communications radios. The student will then determine the nearest suitable airport for landing. The student, using only navigation radios or devices employing analog course-deviation indicators, will complete, to the PTS standards, a non-precision approach to that airport, including a full-stop landing, without the assistance of air traffic control.
Note: This would require that all TAA aircraft used for instrument examinations have at least one working analog CDI. It could be wired to a nav radio or a GPS, but its purpose is to specifically prevent the student from having access to the graphic displays.
Then add the same task to all biannual flight reviews and required recurrent training for all certificates. Make it a certificate-revoking condition should the candidate fail the task. I guarantee you that the CFIT rate would plummet.
In reply to:
Bravo! Precisely! And whatÂ’s the most central instrument when youÂ’re stressed? The attitude portion of the PFD! ThatÂ’s why I think itÂ’s so important that the PDF be clear in what it is (and isnÂ’t!) saying.
Joe;
Nobody is disagres with you, but you are preaching to the choir.
If a change is to be made, get on the manufacturers. We all agree that there is always room for improvement in almost every area of every aircraft, and accidents are caused by many factors.
My point has always been to “control what you can” given the equipment that is available.
And BTW, if you are going to post this much, how about rejoining and not hiding behind your initials.
In reply to:
Nobody is disagres with you, but you are preaching to the choir.
Could of fooled me!
In reply to:
And BTW, if you are going to post this much, how about rejoining and not hiding behind your initials.
Good idea, but no thanks. Been there; done that. And I’m not hiding, I just didn’t know you were that interested in who’s posting. I’ll sign my posts from now on.
Joe Mazza
In reply to:
And BTW, if you are going to post this much, how about rejoining and not hiding behind your initials.
Dennis,
For obvious reasons (I hope!), you know that I’m all for people joining COPA - there are many benefits.
And I enjoy, and agree with, many of your posts.
In this case, I think that your post is a little unfair. Joe has never “hidden behind” his initials as far as I recall; and he is among the few who have joined and chosen not to renew. I don’t know why posting a certain amount (how much, exactly?) is itself a reason to join.
I join you in encouraging everyone who reads these forums to join, but I have no issue with someone’s decision not to - especially someone who has made that decision with data and experience. I’m pleased to note that this happens very, very rarely - almost everyone who joins, stays!
This is an interesting debate, and I thank all those who have participated for the “food for thought” provided.
- Mike.
In reply to:
Here’s a new panel design that’s guaranteed not to give “the illusion of flying into unobstructed air”…
lol! CanÂ’t argue with that!
Joe Mazza
In reply to:
How about this in rebuttal:
If they hadn’t had the FMS and GPWS, the pilot and navigator would have been a lot more alert to where they were at any given time and therefore said “hey, that turn will aim us right at the mountain side. Something is wrong here, don’t do that!”
neoLuddite.
Luddite: Function: noun
Etymology: perhaps from Ned Ludd, 18th century Leicestershire workman who destroyed machinery
: one of a group of early 19th century English workmen destroying laborsaving machinery as a protest; broadly : one who is opposed to especially technological change
Let me reiterate.
There is a 100 year aviation history of airmen CFIT, regardless of huge training/selection efforts. Humans are fallible, and make mistakes, including ignoring or misreading charts; always have, always will.
That record has only been improved with technology, most especially TAWS and GPWS, and now, for US airlines, CFITs are a thing of the past.
The 1995 Cali accident was the ‘exception which proved the rule’, and the report stated that the accident would have been avoided with TAWS and better information display.
These days, a $1700 Garmin196, or an even cheaper PDA, offer GPS and TAWS; cost is no longer an object, but integrated, optimal presentation of the information (audible, visual, message) is.
In reply to:
Being worried (scared) that they were going to end up off course and hit something like cumulo-granite or those old HUGE radio masts is why old aviators spent entire flights working and re-working navigation problems.
DoesnÂ’t sound like my idea of pleasure flight. They were using the best available technology of their time and still flew into terrain at a much higher rate than modern avionics assisted pilots do; we should use the best technology of our time, also.
In reply to:
My point is that more pilot training in the use of raw position data (NBD, GPS, VOR) and constantly updating position, altitude, heading, time-to-next-fix, etc on real sectional charts is needed. Even if you’re on an IFR flight plan, knowing where you are relative to the ground without relying on the TV screen in front of you will always keep you away from CFIT.
The Cali crew were at 7K feet, on an IFR flightplan, at night, the mountains were unlit, not in radar coverage, and they chose to wander around while sorting out their IFR approach. They were more highly selected, trained, and current than any GA pilot can expect to be.
In reply to:
I think we are going to find, when the NTSB is done, that the result is pilot error flying into adverse conditions.
An unsatisfying conclusion.
The pilot was IFR rated, and capable. Surely, with warning, this accident would not have happened. What did happen?
I just don’t understand your reluctance to focus on pilot error.
Being IFR rated does not necessarily bestow “judgment”
Licensed people (car or plane) sometimes do things without completly thinking through their goals in advance.
As I understand this whole thread, there seems to be a desire to allocate blame or curability (I don’t know if that’s a word) on the "equipment.
Instruments are merely tools. Without judgment, it doesn’t matter how good they are . . . accidents will happen.
Lots of accidents happen . . . with warning to the pilot. . . if the pilot doesn’t see the signs that are given.
In reply to:
exactly what audible, visual, and message information it would have given …?
TAWS will give a Caution 40-60 seconds before possible conflict. That will produce an audible “TERRAIN! TERRAIN!”, light a yellow lamp on the TAWS panel, highlight the terrain on the MFD in yellow, and raise an MFD message. 30 seconds before conflict there will be a Warning, with audible “TERRAIN - PULL UP”, a red lamp on the panel, and the MFD terrain in red with a message. The proper response is described in the POH:
The full POH text is available in the last supplement in the currently online POH at Cirrus.
In reply to:
Roy
Since you have a 22G2 with TAWS, could you tell us exactly what audible, visual, and message information it would have given you if you flew as the accident plane did (towards the ridge)?
How could your plane, with TAWS, have done the same thing?
Also, what do you think of the idea of the adding some terrain warning messages or visual clues to the PFD?
In reply to:
I think we are going to find, when the NTSB is done, that the result is pilot error flying into adverse conditions.
An unsatisfying conclusion.
The pilot was IFR rated, and capable. Surely, with warning, this accident would not have happened. What did happen?
With regard to your first question,tThe TAWS at one minute before im[act would have givven me a yellow alert light, and the verbal message CAUTION, TERRAIN…CAUTION, TERRAIN. It would have repeated that message every 7 seconds until I was 30 seconds from impact. I could also switch to the TAWS screen on the MFD and see by color exactly where the terrain was and where I could change course to avoid it. At 30 seconds from impact it would have given me a red light and the verbal alert TERRAIN, PULL UP…TERRAIN, PULL UP.
You did not ask for my input on the second part, but since I was flying in the area at the same time I will tell you that and IFR rating does you little good if you are flying on VFR and enter IMC unexpectedly at night in mountains. It was not a VFR night based on my observation and I was flying in the general area just a few hours before.
In reply to:
Instruments are merely tools. Without judgment, it doesn’t matter how good they are . . . accidents will happen.
True, but the better the tools the fewer the accidents. Blade guards on circular saws have saved a lot of fingers! (Though I’m sure a careful user like you would never need one.)
Dennis
In reply to:
I just don’t understand your reluctance to focus on pilot error.
Because I want the GA accident rate to drop.
Pilot error is a very broad term; there are different levels of error.
Improperly solving a quadratic equation in your head is one type of error, misreading or miss-entering a heading is another, failing to remain alert or read a chart is another, and failing to react when someone yells ‘duck’ is another.
As the recent accidents show, itÂ’s too easy for an improper heading, or altitude, or a failure to climb to cause a GA CFIT, where some type of simple pilot error (of omission or judgment) leads to a CFIT with no explicit warning.
I believe that proper presentation of affordable and available terrain data can give pilots explicit warning, and the information to escape safely after the warning is given.
In reply to:
Being IFR rated does not necessarily bestow “judgment”
No, but it does give the ability to climb into IMC to avoid terrain, if necessary.
In reply to:
As I understand this whole thread, there seems to be a desire to allocate blame or curability (I don’t know if that’s a word) on the "equipment.
No, I think itÂ’s about using/applying/developing/refining available, affordable technology to make GA safer.
IÂ’m sick of hearing/reading of GA CFIT accidents, and I hope to God technology can help us because I despair of improving human beings.
In reply to:
Instruments are merely tools. Without judgment, it doesn’t matter how good they are . . . accidents will happen.
Avoiding terrain by paying constant attention to your location, procedures, charts, etc. takes substantial and continual dedication, discipline, and judgment.
Flying to avoid the red blobs, or pulling up when told to requires much less.
In reply to:
Lots of accidents happen . . . with warning to the pilot. . . if the pilot doesn’t see the signs that are given.
I have lots of examples of non-TAWS aircraft going CFIT with no explicit warning.
Do you have an example of a properly functioning TAWS equipped aircraft making a CFIT, ignoring explicit audio and visual warnings? In the Cali crash, they had no TAWS, and the GPWS software was later fixed to give sooner ‘pull up’ warnings when such high terrain was involved.
I cannot see how an instrument capable (or a VFR pilot with an autopilot) pilot can fly a functional airplane into terrain, if heÂ’s properly presented the terrain and a audible, visual, and message warnings.
From one of your previous posts:
In reply to:
If a change is to be made, get on the manufacturers. We all agree that there is always room for improvement in almost every area of every aircraft, and accidents are caused by many factors.
My point has always been to “control what you can” given the equipment that is available.
Singularly, you or I may have no influence with manufacturers, however, COPA can and should. Perhaps if COPAians thrash things out, and reach some agreement, we can have a positive effect.
In reply to:
True, but the better the tools the fewer the accidents. Blade guards on circular saws have saved a lot of fingers! (Even though I’m sure a careful user like you would never need one.)
Ya see Joe . . . that’s where we differ.
Try this . . . The better the tools, the more information that the pilot is given with which to make decisions.
More tools also equals more confusion, more distractions, more to learn.
This forum, both member and non-member side is a good example of how much we don’t know, and what we don’t know and don’t take the time to learn, causes accidents.
Thousands of questions posed by pilots who don’t yet understand some aspect of their aircraft (yet still fly).
Think of all the questions that go unanswered by pilots who have the equipment but not the knowledge, and don’t even know that they don’t know.
The older I get, the more I realize, the less I know.
Steve Demy in an earlier post said it better than I can:
In reply to:
No one would argue that any of this replaces training, knowledge or skill, but there’s no rational argument for ignoring simple changes that may save lives.
Peace.
Joe Mazza
In reply to:
and don’t even know that they don’t know.
The older I get, the more I realize, the less I know.
Well said! This acident most likely had it’s genesis many years ago.
First, let’s get back to the question at hand and understand why this accident happened.
- I have flown the Columbia Gorge so many times I forget about all the close calls. Many of these flights were without PFD/MFD or even GPS.
- The airport they were headed to is probably one of the hardest airports to get into and out of in the Pacific Northwest. Winds are horendous, no apporach and he walls of the Columbia Gorge tower above you by at least a thousand feet.
Going into Hood River from Salem Oregon during bright day VFR conditions is a rewarding experience but still requires caution and planning. Do so at night is just plain stupid. He could have landed at PDX and driven in a car the 25 miles home. My belief is that regardless of TAWS GPWS or anything short of Ground Radar Controled Autopilot flown aircraft like the Navy E-6B, this flight could not have been accomplished with a positive outcome.
Dennis, thank you, I believe you are right and we see things happening due to pilot’s over confidence in their aircraft and equipment and we must back up this technology with pilots skills and execising good judgement. This pilot did not exercise good judgement and he and the aircraft owner and business assoicate are dead.
Thanks.
Cirrus on order…
In reply to:
…we see things happening due to pilot’s over confidence in their aircraft and equipment and we must back up this technology with pilots skills and execising good judgement…
There’s quite a lot of agreement happening on this thread that sounds like disagreement! But to split hairs about the quote above: It is pilot’s skill and judgment that is paramount, the technology is in support - not the other way around. However, to pass up an opportunity to improve the technology would be to miss a chance to save lives. We need to take clues from these accidents about how to improve BOTH the man AND the machine.
I can’t accept an argument in favor of ignoring either one.