The TAWS changes color - but it was designed for terrain avoidance. The moving map was not.
In reply to:
Pilots may be our own worst enemy.
I would change that to say Pilots ARE our own worst enemy (or as Pogo would say, we have met the enemy and they are us).
The OVERWHELMING majority of accidents - GA, military, and air carrier, are related to pilot errors. I have little doubt that will not change appreciably in the future. We may be able to lower the overall accident rate with better training, judgment training and better technology, but pilot error will remain the primary cause of aviation mishaps.
Charlie:
EXACTLY right. And that was my point to Joe. If you incorporated TAWS into the PFD and showed the data on the PFD Attitude indicator, it would encourange flying below MOCA. The pilot would say: “I can go lower because the TAWS says I am still 800 feet above the nearest obstacle here”. I am glad that systems are being designed to NOT show the data when you are at an “illegal” altitude.
I do not think the color or the “blandness” of the current PFD is responsible for CFIT accidents as any properly trained pilot ALREADY knows it is NOT a terrain avoidance device.
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I do not think the color or the “blandness” of the current PFD is responsible for CFIT accidents…
Neither do I, on both counts. I don’t think the PFD was responsible for the CFIT accident, only that it may have contributed to it; and it’s not the “blandness” of the PFD that’s potentially misleading, it’s precisely it’s lack of blandness – the shading of the “sky” and “ground” to make it more realistic (i.e., less bland) – that could be misleading. (I won’t repeat the reasons here but my other posts explain why.)
Unfortunately, we have seen just that. Although, in an emergency, we have found that a pilot can use the display very well to descend into a valley when carrying a load of ice or fly a single engine climb out, assuming two engines at takeoff, up a valley and through a mountain pass. These were both in simulators but IÂ’ve done quite a lot of research flying for NASA where an SVS display provides the visual cues to safely do an IFR circling approach or a curved, multi-segmented mountain approach.
We have recently completed a set of visual circling maneuvers at RNO at night, with the SVS terrain display, you know where every hill and tree is, this makes for a virtually day VMC maneuver and does enhance safety. Many planes have hit fairly low hills while circling or in a VFR pattern at night, in mountainous terrain. Would I try this in the Cirrus with the standard PFD, not unless I could visually find every obstacle. Beter yet, I will go out and fly the ILS, at night.
Charlie Cope
SN12
Brian: (Nice first name by the way…)
Good example. Anti lock brakes actually CAUSED more accidents when they first came out for the same reason. It is no different in the cockpit. The human IS the factor that needs the must continuous updating; not the avionics.
Here is another example if we have not seen enough: A well trained and proficient American Airlines plane flew right into a mountain outside Cali, Columbia a few years ago. Why did this happen? They had “advanced technology” and it was the fancy advanced box that they pregrammed wrong resulting in the autopilot turning them directly into the mountain as the waypoint they mistakenly entered was to the left of course instaed of the one straight ahead. Since they were flying in a canyon, the left turn was a disaster.
Now, would that accident have happened before the days of FMS and fancy autopilots?
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Now, would that [the Cali, Columbia] accident have happened before the days of FMS and fancy autopilots?
Maybe not that particular accident, on that particular day, with that particular crew, but the more salient question is, How many other accidents were avoided because of FMS’s and autopilots? A cursory look at airline safety over the years will answer that question.
I readily admit that high tech + lack of training/knowledge is a receipe for disaster. (That’s why I like to have as many things on my side as possible, including good ergonomics.) But do you propose eliminating VOR’s, GPS, ILS’s, and AI’s? By your theory we were safer in the days of A/N ranges and needle-ball attitude!
In reply to:
Here is another example if we have not seen enough: A well trained and proficient American Airlines plane flew right into a mountain outside Cali, Columbia a few years ago. Why did this happen? They had “advanced technology” and it was the fancy advanced box that they pregrammed wrong resulting in the autopilot turning them directly into the mountain as the waypoint they mistakenly entered was to the left of course instaed of the one straight ahead. Since they were flying in a canyon, the left turn was a disaster.
Now, would that accident have happened before the days of FMS and fancy autopilots?
There seems to be a difference of optimism as to the potential positive impact TAWS and improved information display can have on GA CFIT accidents.
I believe this to be a topic worthy of spirited COPA analysis and debate.
There is the ‘too much automation, they should have been better trained, smarter, more disciplined pilots’ position and the ‘there but for the grace of God go I, I want all the help I can get’ side.
Here is the 1995 Cali AA accident report
The accident report provides text to support both the ‘too much reliance on automation’, and the ‘insufficient presentation of information’ views.
However, the flight crew chose the FMS heading that lead to the mountain, and indications are that they would have hand flown the same heading, with the same result; such accidents litter the history of aviation, far beyond any automation.
The accident plane had GPWS, which gave warning of the terrain, but too late to completely clear the ridge, but did not have TAWS which would have given the needed graphical portrayal to avoid the peak altogether.
Some items from the report, which I think support the ‘improved information’ position:
2.4 Awareness of Terrain
Â….
· Terrain information was not shown on the electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) or graphically portrayed on the approach chart
· The night visual conditions limited the ability to see the terrain
Â…
Had this portrayal of terrain been available to the flightcrew, and had they referred to charts containing the information, it may have heightened their awareness of the proximity of terrain in their flightpath and the accident could have been avoided.
also
In addition, technological advances in the more than one decade since the introduction of “glass cockpit” aircraft allow for the presentation of terrain information on FMS-generated displays, a feature that was not possible at the time of their introduction. This information can enhance pilot situation awareness and considerably expand the ability of pilots operating glass cockpit aircraft to maintain awareness of the proximity of terrain to the airplane’s flightpath. Therefore, because of the importance of FMS-generated displays to flightcrew situation awareness, Aeronautica Civil believes that that the FAA should encourage manufacturers to develop and validate methods of accurately displaying terrain information on airplane flightpath displays.
also
The limited visibility resulting from nighttime conditions at the time of the accident also hindered the flightcrew’s terrain awareness. As a result, they were unable to visually recognize the terrain until just before impact while descending towards Cali, despite the visual meteorological conditions with visibility “greater than 10 kilometers” [27] that were present. The fact that the captain, the only one of the two flightcrew members to have operated into Cali, had likely previously landed only at night, also limited his appreciation for the presence of the mountains along either side of the approach into Cali.
In addition, the actions of the captain are consistent with literature that indicates that under stress, people tend to narrow their focus of attention [32].
Probably the most widespread finding is that under various forms of stress, people tend to narrow their field of attention to include only a limited number of central aspects.
and
4.0 Recommendations
…
6. Encourage manufacturers to develop and validate methods to present accurate terrain information on flight displays as part of a system of early ground proximity warning. (Enhanced GPWS)
Since CFIT accidents have been with since the dawn of aviation, I donÂ’t see how they can be blamed on automation, and I also doubt they can be eliminated through improved pilot selection or training.
However, as in this accident, I believe that the (now affordable and available) proper terrain graphical display and earlier warning can prevent most CFIT accidents.
Joe:
I am not sure I buy that argument. The purpose of the blue sky/brown bottom is to make the horizon line more visible and to be clear which is up (blue) versus what is down (brown) on the instrument. Do you have evidence that adding color CAUSES the pilot to somehow think something else? I would love to see that data.
I’m not being clear. I never said nor do I mean that blue/brown is the problem (if there is one – remember I’m just speculating); it’s the shading of the colors which gives a more photorealistic effect that could, subliminally, be confused with looking out the windshield.
I am not suggesting going back to the old days. What IAM suggesting is that, if you want to play with new gadgetry, you better know how to use it and, more importantly, learn how to trouble shoot it. There really is a HIGHER burden of responsibility on the part of the pilot when using TAA devices.
But the talk and the inference is that the gadgetry makes it EASIER on the pilot. Not true! The well trained Cali crew never LOOKED to see what their FMS was doing to them after they programmed it. They assumed it would fly them in the right direction. You cannot do that! It is all about attitude. You HAVE GOT to treat each device in your plane with an air of suspicion and fly with the notion that anything cab break at any time or malfunction in a way that can hurt you.
I still, to this day, after 400 hours in an SR22, still do not totally trust the autopilot. I love the fact that I can sit back and let “george” fly on a long trip. But I NEVER take my eyes off of what that thing is doing just in case it has a few surprises in store for me.
this whole thread is joke, right ?
But we digress. No one has argued that training isn’t essential. Of course it is! But it’s unarguably easier to teach someone to drive in a car with automatic transmission than manual, even though you can screw up an automatic too if you don’t know what you’re doing.
The arguments you put forth only support the notion that the less ambiguity in our high-tech gadgets the better. I’m simply specualting that the PFD could perhaps be made just a little bit less ambiguous, or at least less prone to misinterpretation (at least as far as terrain goes), if it looked a bit less like looking out the windshield.
Again, there may be no problem at all, or if there is one it may be outweighed by the added attitude awareness afforded by the more photorealistic display. (That’s an argument I could listen to and respect.)
In reply to:
Again, there may be no problem at all, or if there is one it may be outweighed by the added attitude awareness afforded by the more photorealistic display. (That’s an argument I could listen to and respect.)
While I am by no means an authority in how the human brain processes information, I have spent a significant amount of time (probably more time than I should be willing to admit in the “public” forum) reading about how people (specifically adults) learn. To avoid getting in to more detail than might be necessary, suffice to say that adults (pretty much regardless of learning modiality) through association. We naturally connect what is new to us to what is familiar to us.
I would venture to guess that part of the reason that those colors were selected IS EXACTLY because of the ‘natural’ connection we have with regard to what color the ground is and what color the sky is. Think about the very first map that you saw in school, what color was the land? My guess, probably brown. So why, since most of us see more “green” when flying than we see brown, did they not select green. I’d bet because there isn’t really enough contrast between the “blue sky” and “green”.
Regards,
Brian
(Disclaimer: It is late, I am on cold medicine, am sleep deprived and “actually” for a moment considered searching Google to see if I could come up with a link that explained the choice of colors. Fortuntely for me, someone called, and upon my return, I had forgotten what I was going to Google. Anyone want to let me fly their plane?? Ha-Ha)
In reply to:
I would venture to guess that part of the reason that those colors were selected IS EXACTLY because of the ‘natural’ connection we have with regard to what color the ground is and what color the sky is.
Once again, I am not questioning the choice of colors for the PFD! I’m questioning the photorealism of the display, specifically the shading of the colors towards the horizon which gives the illusion of looking out an actual windshield. I readily admit that the more realistic the better in terms of attitude awareness. I agree that adults learn by association. My only question is whether that association could go too far, i.e., associating the PFD so much with the view out the windshield that a pilot, however subtlety or subliminally, might expect to get more than attitude info from the PFD just as he does from the windshield. ThatÂ’s all.
ItÂ’s just a question guys. IÂ’m sure IÂ’m not the first one whoÂ’s thought of it.
In reply to:
I’m questioning the photorealism of the display, specifically the shading of the colors towards the horizon which gives the illusion of looking out an actual windshield.
JM
Don’t you have something better to do? Here. Pick a color that you would like. When you finally buy a plane instead of just analyzing them, I will personally call Avidyne and advise them of your choice
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Don’t you have something better to do? Here. Pick a color that you would like.
Brilliant, Dennis. And it really moves the discussion forward.
Look, if youÂ’re going to make personal attacks please give me the courtesy of reading my posts first, okay? For the record, and for at least the third time, itÂ’s not the colors.
Dennis
I think what jim0045 is saying is that there could/should be some explicit indicator on the PFD that you are heading for terrain. Maybe a message, maybe a color change, maybe a representative visual presentation. Hard to argue against, in my opinion.
Lets see what we can agree on, based on the available information and reasonable extensions:
. The recent Oregon pilot flew into the ridge (VFR at night) without any explicit electronic warning (audible, message on the PFD, etc.).
. With GPS and available computing power, Avionics vendors can affordably provide audible, message, and visual warning (al la TAWS)
. There have been several other reent Cirrus and other make IFR (mostly missed approaches) and VFR (night/low vis) crashes where pilots flew into terrain without explicit electronic warning.
. If all those pilots had explicit audible and PFD message/visual indicators (TAWS) at least some of them would have avoided the terrain.
. If some component of the avionics detects that the flight path is intersecting terrain, it would be nice if the PFD would reflect that, also.
The CFIT crashes discussed recently (the NC kingair missed approach, the CA night VFR mountain hit, the Oregon one, etc.) were not guys hot-dogging relying on advanced avionics, they just hit terrain they could not see and were not explicitly warned about (just like pilots have done for 100 years).
Dennis, you can question jim0045Â’s, or my, authority to comment on this forum, just as some might question one who lives in south floridaÂ’s authority to discuss terrain avoidance and TAWS.
I am all for open discourse, however:
- I believe that courtesy demands that when I am engaged in communication with a person, it helps, and is polite to know their name, and their background so as to better understand from where they are coming.
JM has provided neither. - Just my opinion, but I believe that this discussion is caught up in minutia and, as the saying goes, misses the forrest for the trees.
While “color” and “shades” are valid positions to improving the avoidance of accidents, I for one will not allow pilots, or my children to cop out and make it a justification for behavior.
I expect your response will be something like:
Well, does it contribute to confusion or disorientation and ultimately accidents?
Yes, it may, and so does getting out of bed in the morning.
But, if I prepare properly for the day ahead, the shape or color of the clouds will not impede my daily progress or safety.
Per chance, would this be you:
MAZZA, CAPTAIN Joe Retired served with VP-5 Mad Foxes from 1972 through 1975…Captain Mazza was born in Memphis, Tennessee, on June 2, 1946. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1968 with a Bachelor of Science degree and a major in Foreign Affairs. He was designated a Naval Aviator in 1969. After serving for two years as a flight instructor with Training Squadron 3 at NAS Whiting Field, Milton, Florida, he reported in 1972 to Patrol Squadron 5 at NAS Jacksonville, Florida, where he completed three deployments to Atlantic and Mediterranean bases. From 1975 to 1977, he attended the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, graduating with a Master of Science degree in Operations Research. He was next assigned to the staff of Commander Carrier Group 5 homeported at NAS Cubi Point, Philippines, where he served as the Air Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer. During his two years on that staff he completed several Western Pacific and Indian Ocean deployments. In 1980 he was assigned to Patrol Squadron 48 at NAS Moffett Field, California, where he served as Operations Officer until 1982, deploying to NAF Kadena, Okinawa, Japan, Japan and NAS Adak, Alaska. He next served on the staff of the U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific at Camp Smith, Hawaii, as Senior Military Analyst in the Research and Analysis Division. In 1984 he reported to Antarctic Development Squadron 6 at NAS Point Mugu, California, for his first Aviation command. He completed three deployments to Antarctica and was the squadron Commanding Officer from April 1986 to May 1987. He next attended the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island earning a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies in 1988. After graduating, he stayed on at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies as a CNO Research Fellow until March 1989. Captain Mazza assumed major aviation command as Commander, U.S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica homeported at CBC Port Hueneme, California, and completed his fourth and fifth antarctic deployments. From 1991-1995, Captain Mazza served as the Commanding Officer and Professor of Naval Science for the Carnegie Mellon University NROTC Unit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Captain Mazza retired in August, 1995 after 28 years of dedicated service to the United States Navy. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon, Meritorious Unit Citation Ribbon, Navy “E” Ribbon (2), Navy and Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal, National Defense Service Medal (2), Antarctica Service Medal, and Sea Service Deployment Ribbon
In reply to:
I think what jim0045 is saying is that there could/should be some explicit indicator on the PFD that you are heading for terrain. Maybe a message, maybe a color change, maybe a representative visual presentation. Hard to argue against, in my opinion.
Thanks for the support, but thatÂ’s not quite what IÂ’m saying (though I agree itÂ’s hard to argue with). What IÂ’m saying is that the PFD ought not to give the illusion of flying into clear air (i.e., the photorealistic impression of a terrain-free, VMC day) unless it does provide terrain info. Since the Cirrus PFD doesnÂ’t provide terrain info, then it shouldnÂ’t look like it might, however subtlety or subliminally. My recommendation would be to simply remove the shading. That way youÂ’d still get plenty of attitude info without the illusion of looking out a real windshield at the real world.