The Oregon SR22 crash recently reported in AVweb appears to be another CFIT (since the plane hit a ridge line while VFR at night).
While no one knows the cause yet, incidents like this may raise an issue with the PFD. Unlike the Chelton PFD which shows synthetic terrain, the PFD in the Cirrus gives the illusion of flying into unobstructed air, when in fact there could be dangerous terrain ahead.
I know the Cirrus PFD is designed to show a lifelike “out the windshield” view to help in attitude awareness, but perhaps it’s a bit too lifelike?
The Oregon SR22 crash recently reported in AVweb appears to be another CFIT (since the plane hit a ridge line while VFR at night).
While no one knows the cause yet, incidents like this may raise an issue with the PFD. Unlike the Chelton PDF which shows synthetic terrain, the PFD in the Cirrus gives the illusion of flying into unobstructed air, when in fact there could be dangerous terrain ahead.
I know the Cirrus PFD is designed to show a lifelike “out the windshield” view to help in attitude awareness, but perhaps it’s a bit too lifelike?
Just a thought.
I disagree. I was flying in Northern Oregon that evening just a couple of hours before this incident. It very simply was not a VFR flight. I was IFR and there were multiple layers of clouds, notices for moderate turbulence, and ground fog and haze building. This to me is a classic example of night VFR in MVFR conditions (at best). I heard it was a very experience pilot who apparently knew the area, so I think perhaps just a bit to bold. I have TAWS in my plane and still would not have tried a night VFR flight on that evening. The PFD does NOTHING for terrain avoidance. I think we are going to find, when the NTSB is done, that the result is pilot error flying into adverse conditions.
I agree with the prior posters that this is an unwarranted concern.
Do we need a placard on the PFD that says “NO TERRAIN INFORMATION”? (like the one one regarding pitch info on turn coordinators?) After the first lawsuit generated by thinking like this, I wouldn’t bet against them.
If so, then we need to go back and placard all the Attitude Indicators/Artificial Horizons out there - IIRC they don’t show terrain either.
The Oregon SR22 crash recently reported in AVweb appears to be another CFIT (since the plane hit a ridge line while VFR at night).
While no one knows the cause yet, incidents like this may raise an issue with the PFD. Unlike the Chelton PDF which shows synthetic terrain, the PFD in the Cirrus gives the illusion of flying into unobstructed air, when in fact there could be dangerous terrain ahead.
I know the Cirrus PFD is designed to show a lifelike “out the windshield” view to help in attitude awareness, but perhaps it’s a bit too lifelike?
Just a thought.
It would be useful if the lower section changed color with the the obstacle height ahead. The information is available, and there should be enough computing power available. My antique ARNAV does this in a way. It definitely gets your attention when it turns red!
Good discussions last October: (hope the links work) http://http://click here
/forums/t/14433.aspx
Gaynor
I agree with your line of thinking here JM. Aircraft flap switches are shaped like flaps, and gear levers are shaped like wheels for a reason.
These accidents provide an opportunity to identify small improvements in the planes. Why ignore the chance? The alternate static should not be down by your right ankle. Maybe there is room for improvement in the PDF presentation.
No one would argue that any of this replaces training, knowledge or skill, but there’s no rational argument for ignoring simple changes that may save lives.
The PFD does NOTHING for terrain avoidance. I think we are going to find, when the NTSB is done, that the result is pilot error flying into adverse conditions.
I agree completely that the Avidyne PFD does nothing for terrain avoidance (though the Chelton PFD does). But I submit that there are worse things than doing nothing: like lulling pilot into a false sense of security, however subliminally, which might be at least a contributing factor.
I have TAWS in my plane and still would not have tried a night VFR flight on that evening. The PFD does NOTHING for terrain avoidance.
Roy
Since you have a 22G2 with TAWS, could you tell us exactly what audible, visual, and message information it would have given you if you flew as the accident plane did (towards the ridge)?
How could your plane, with TAWS, have done the same thing?
Also, what do you think of the idea of the adding some terrain warning messages or visual clues to the PFD?
In reply to:
I think we are going to find, when the NTSB is done, that the result is pilot error flying into adverse conditions.
An unsatisfying conclusion.
The pilot was IFR rated, and capable. Surely, with warning, this accident would not have happened. What did happen?
But I submit that there are worse things than doing nothing: like lulling pilot into a false sense of security, however subliminally, which might be at least a contributing factor.
Lulling a pilot into a false sense of . . . What the F***
A pilots tools don’t dictate to the pilot.
The PILOT is in charge
The PILOT must know and understand the abilities and limitations of his equiptment.
The PILOT must fly the plane . . . not the reverse
That comment is just plane (no pun intended) Bul*Sh**
I will not give up my flying skills and judgment to the equiptment in my plane.
The equiptmnet provides me with information . . . I interpret it.
When we get to the point when we NEED a terrain avoiding PFD, I think we are all in trouble as pilots.
This sounds like a classic scud run event that is known to be deadly. There have already been too many of these.
WE have all just got to agree that, when visibility is low, you are in AN IFR SCENARIO and need to fly as such.
With IFR, you NEVER descend below minimum published altitudes unless you have the airport in sight. Clearly this was not the case here.
PFD or otherwise, if you do not follow basic principals, you are taking your life in your hands. This type of thing does not have to happen.
Human factors engineering (a.k.a., ergonomics) has long been recognized as an important element in aviation safety. When a mishap occurs, one of the things you look at as a possible contributing factor is the man-machine interface.
I’m not suggesting at all that the PFD was the proximate cause of this mishap, just that it may have been a contributing factor and, as such, may benefit from some reengineering. Just as blue-up-brown-down has become the AI standard since it was found to be superior to earlier all-black AI’s, it’s just possible that the PFD could be improved too.
Do we need a placard on the PFD that says “NO TERRAIN INFORMATION”? (like the one regarding pitch info on turn coordinators?)
Well then why is there such a warning on the turn coordinator? Because if you’re not careful you could misinterpret what you’re seeing – hence the warning. (It may have been the result of a lawsuit, but I don’t think so.) I agree that most proficient pilots would not make that mistake. But sometimes we get subliminal signals that aren’t useful and can even be harmful. (After all, that’s why we cover up a dead AI.) So to the extent that we can engineer them out (like perhaps foregoing the realistic shading on the PDF in favor of non-shaded blue and brown) the better.
I view the primary purpose of the PFD is to act as an expanded and easier to interpret artificial horizon. As such, its purpose is to keep you flying stright and level when you need to be level and in the proper turn configuration when you are turning. In short, its function is to keep the “right side up”.
It is NOT the purpose of the PFD to prevent you from hitting something.
Flying below MOCA or MDA or DH without a clear view of the ground is what makes you hit stuff.
Dennis,
Human factors engineering (a.k.a., ergonomics) has long been recognized as an important element in aviation safety. When a mishap occurs, one of the things you look at as a possible contributing factor is the man-machine interface.
I’m not suggesting at all that the PFD was the proximate cause of this mishap, just that it may have been a contributing factor and, as such, may benefit from some reengineering. Just as blue-up-brown-down has become the AI standard since it was found to be superior to earlier all-black AI’s, it’s just possible that the PFD could be improved too.
Someone let me know if it is better to let sleeping threads lie, but in this month’s Flying Magazine Richard Collins has an article titled “How to avoid deadly distractions while flying IFR” The subtitle is “Confusion”.
There is a discussion of the attitude gyros of the 50’s and how they presented information.
“The attitude indicator had a miniature airplane symbol, and we called it the artificial horizon. There was no blue/ brown background, just the line representing the horizon… There was some confusion among pilots during the transition period, too. The turn coordinator looked so much like an old artificial horizon that some pilots, in the heat of battle, thought it was giving a pitch indication.” It goes on to talk about improvements in the DG. The same information is now presented in a more intuitive manner.
What I take from this is that a confusing or ambiguous presentation could be the last straw when in trouble in IFR.
Those who feel strongly about his may want to read the entire article. Other than the timing, it could have been written in response to the recent Florida accident.
Since you could make an identical argument for any human factors improvement, perhaps you’re suggesting that aircraft ergonomics are perfect in their present state and cannot be improved upon? (BTW, it was you who suggested a warning label, not me. All I’m suggesting is that the presentation might be improved a bit by making it less prone to subliminal misinterpretation without losing much in terms of attitude information.)
