It was inevitable...

From Aero-news…Cirrus and BRS are being sued in connection with the stall-spin accident in the northeast awhile back. Of interest to me (being a lawyer) was the following: “The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilots’ failure to maintain airspeed, which resulted in an inadvertent stall/spin. The continued spin to the ground was a result of the pilots’ failure to deploy the onboard parachute recovery system, for undetermined reasons.”

It is interesting that the FAA identified the failure to deploy the chute as a cause for spinning into the ground, rather than the pilot’s failure to “chop power, neutralize controls and press opposite rudder.” I expect the plaintiff’s argument will be that there was difficulty in getting the chute to deploy due to some mechanical malfunction (eg, the stiffness in the cable and required pounds to pull) and, since the chute is the ONLY approved method of spin recovery, Cirrus and BRS should be held responsible.

It seems a shame to me (as a lawyer) that there can be a set of facts, such as this case, where an accident is clearly the fault of pilot technique (both in inducing the spin and failure to recover) and yet, because of the regulatory induced difficulty in completing a spin certification, and the company’s desire to add a margin of safety (the chute), the result ends up being a near text-book case against the manufacturer.

I expect the plaintiff’s argument will be that there was difficulty in getting the chute to deploy due to some mechanical malfunction (eg, the stiffness in the cable and required pounds to pull) and, since the chute is the ONLY approved method of spin recovery, Cirrus and BRS should be held responsible.

I suggest you read the current article on the AOPA web site about this accident. They indicate that planes like Cirrus are difficult to recover from a spin.

Any plane is difficult to recover from a spin at low altitude, even the best aerobatic planes. And that the plane spun at all (if it did) doesn’t imply Cirrus’ negligence.

I knew someone who spun in in a Pitts. The aircraft is certified to recover from spins. It happens. it sucks, but it happens.

If we take the argument further, we can assume all airplanes are thusly unairworthy because they can spin. This argument failed when, a while back, someone sued Piper implying that the Cub, and all tailwheel aircraft are defective because if reduced forward visibility and/or “unconventional” ground handling.

Jeff

I did in fact read that article when it was first published, which prompted me to inquire about it’s assertions with both a test pilot and a Cirrus rep. The test pilot told me that spin-resistant wings may cause spin recovery to take a little longer (and cost more altitude) but otherwise do not impair recovery. The Cirrus rep said that they did fairly exhaustive spin testing on the Cirrus (though they did not seek the FAA certification on the basis of this) and that spin recovery was “conventional” in all respects. It was on the basis on this that I implied in my post that that crash was due to pilot error.

I suspect the basis of the suit is not that the plane went into a spin, but that the only method of recovery (the CAPS) failed to deploy even though they had plenty of altitude when they entered the spin. Even the NTSB reports lists another accident where the pilots were unable to deploy the CAPS. The incident they cite where the CAPS worked was after an SB was installed that post dated the NY accident.

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Even the NTSB reports lists another accident where the pilots were unable to deploy the CAPS. The incident they cite where the CAPS worked was after an SB was installed that post dated the NY accident.
I haven’t read ANYWHERE, in ANY of the FAA or NTSB reports of ANY Cirrus crash, that the NTSB concluded the pilots were UNABLE to deploy the 'chute. There was ONLY one passage from one non-fatal crash report where the report paraphrases the pilot’s account of the event, indicating the pilot said he was unable to deploy the chute. It was the analysis of that crash that led to the redesign of the CAPS cable system, even though the report merely hinted that it might have taken more force than the pilot actually used to get the rocket to fire. Read the report. The NTSB did NOT fault the CAPS nor list it as a contributing factor.

Interestingly, a simple test for hallmarking on the CAPS safety pin shows if the pilot attempts to deploy the chute without first removing the safety pin. A nice fact to have available…

Although at the moment you are refuting an AOPA article based upon an NTSB report with an unnamed source. That is why we need the lawsuit, so that all facts can be attributed, the credibility of the sources evaluated, and the relative merits of the arguments decided.

You do not need a lawsuit for that conclusion. Once again,per the POH, it is prohibited to have a Cirrus enter a spin; PERIOD!

Once again,per the POH, it is prohibited to have a Cirrus enter a spin; PERIOD!

The issue in NY is why did it enter a spin and what were the recovery options since the POH says the CAPS is the only approved recovery. Remember in Cirrus’ own 3 plane demo only 1 worked.

Art; the lawsuit ids about FAULT, not CAPS recovery. The pilot had no busibess getting into a spin in the first place.

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Art; the lawsuit ids about FAULT, not CAPS recovery. The pilot had no busibess getting into a spin in the first place.


I am going to do two things here I never thought I would do–disagree with Brian, and side with Art.

Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer and I do not play one on TV.

All planes can get into a spin. Some enter a spin easier than others. Some recover easier than others. As I understand it, all planes must demonstrate a recovery from a spin to be certified. Cirrus chose to demonstrate the CAPS as its method of recovery. If it can or can’t be recovered using conventional means is irrelevant. The POH says use the CAPS. The plane was certified on the basis that the CAPS, when properly installed and properly used will deploy and might save the lives of the occupants.

If I am on the jury (and I won’t be) and the plaintiff can show by the preponderance of the evidence that an appropriate attempt was made to pull the handle using a reasonably correct technique, and the parachute did not deploy due to improper design or faulty workmanship then I would find Cirrus and or BRS at fault. How they will prove that with all the witnesses dead, I don’t know. Therefore I conclude that to file suit is not unreasonable if there is evidence supporting that theory (OH MY GOD!!! Now I’m agreeing with Dennis, too)

If they are just fishing for a settlement because the plane crashed and their loved ones perished and someone needs to compensate them for their loss, then that is just wrong.

the lawsuit ids about FAULT, not CAPS recovery.

If the plane entered an inadvertent spin and the only recovery didn’t work that makes CAPS part of the FAULT.

Being in a similar liability-targeted industry as general aviation, I have been involved in several litigation cases (as a expert witness and as a juror). While many of the posted comments/opinions are logical and seemingly correct…the general stance of jurors in product liability is that the manufacturer is guilty until proven innocent. A classic deep-pocket syndrome.
Since the Cirrus was not certified for spins…if one gets into a spin…the only potentially corrective action is to deploy CAPS with some altitude restrictions. I feel that the plaintiff attorney will beat the drum that CAPS was somehow difficult or impossible to use, thus the fatality. To fuel the fire is the fact that the CAPS system was modiied by the manufacturer to ease pull action. The perception being - a bad design that may not have been fully corrected.

While the pilot should never have gotten into a spin, that issue will be irrelevant…although in reality, it is the true causal issue. It appears to be exclusively pilot error.

Litigation like this are beneficial for the trial attorneys, plaintiffs and economically harmful to the companies and future buyers of their products. It is an interesting fact that the US has the largest number of attorneys per capita in the entire world.

Mike:
I would agree with you if the situation you outlined WERE correct. The fact that Cirrus did not CERTIFY the plane for spin recovery does NOT mean that the plane was not DEMONSTRATED to be able to recover from a spin. The FAA will not certify an airplane at all that cannot recover from a spin. I am not an expert on all the details of part 23 certification but I am quite certain ALL planes have to spin to be certified.
I see this scenario as no different from flying the airplane beyond the Vne speed. If the plane falls apart exceeding the design limits, whose fault is that? Is that ground for a lawsuit against Cirrus because the pilot exceeded the operating limits?
Entering a spin is clearly no approved by the POH and the certification of the airplane. We all have been TAUGHT to fly to AVOID spins. Stall training is basically spin avaoidance training.
I think it is unfair to blame the manufacturer for stunts of misuse in the plane. Remember your history. These accusations are the kinds of problems that put the GA business out of business in the 1980’s. As stated below, the deep pocket is ALEAYS a target and I see this as another TARGET of opportunity on the part of the plaintiffs.

Since I started this thread, I ought to know who I agree with…but everyone makes good points. I suppose if Cirrus chose to make the chute the only POH approved method of spin recovery, then Cirrus implicitly assumes some risk if it turns out the chute doesn’t deploy or work as designed.

But I feel in my gut that the Cirrus probably recovers from a spin as conventionally as any other plane, maybe requiring a bit more rotation and more altitude…but otherwise conventional. My suspicion is if Cirrus had gone through the full blown spin certification, it probably would have achieved it. Relying on the chute for spin recovery simply saved a lot of time and expense in the certification process.

Thus, I feel it was the choice made by Cirrus during certification (for the sake of economic and time efficiency) that may ultimately cause the company to be liable in this accident, not the design of the plane. Had the plane done the full spin certification, all other things being equal, I have a hard time seeing how the lawyers would have a case.

BTW, there is yet another good article on AOPA’s website today on stall/spins. It re-affirms a lot of old truths (spin instruction kills more people than stall avoidance instruction), but with one big surprise. Commercial rated pilots are the most likely to die by stall spins, followed by private pilots. Students and ATPs are the LEAST likely. Like all things in flying, complacency and over-confidence seem to be the deadliest forces we face!

Notwithstanding the “spin-instruction” argument (I’m a proponent of spin instruction), the Cirrus that spun in had several thousand feet of altitude and began its spin nose down…it later flattened out after a few rotations. I’ve never heard of ANY airplane that can’t recover from a nose down spin, unless it’s rudder is broken off. I think spin familiarity on the part of the pilot might have prevented this accident.

I am not an expert on all the details of part 23 certification but I am quite certain ALL planes have to spin to be certified.

Cirrus was granted an exception from the spin requirement because they convinced the FAA that the CAPS provided an equivalent level of safety.

http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:RhkhWAf7RKYJ:a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2002/pdf/02-30685.pdf+“equivalent+level+of+safety”+spin+sr20&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

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Thus, I feel it was the choice made by Cirrus during certification (for the sake of economic and time efficiency)


I think the FAA has changed its emphasis from spin-recovery to spin-avoidance, and reflected that in their certification procedures. Both Cirrus and Lancair elected not to do spin-certification, but to provide ‘equivalent level of safety’. With Cirrus it was the 'chute. For Lancair it is the rudder-blocker.

Which raises a question in my mind; how can the rudder blocker prevent all spin scenarios? I would think it would still be possible to create an accellerated uncoordinated stall without using the rudders; a scenario such as the the Holland crash where the pilot is making full-power avoidance maneuvers at low speed near the ground comes to mind. A 2-3G banking pull-up with P-factor at stall speed seems like a good formula for entry, even without rudders.

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then Cirrus implicitly assumes some risk if it turns out the chute doesn’t deploy or work as designed.


Damn straight. This might cause a divorce in which case I think Cirrus should be liable for my alimony payments. The only reason my wife will fly with me is because I assured her that the parachute would work as advertised.[;)]

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then Cirrus implicitly assumes some risk if it turns out the chute doesn’t deploy or work as designed.

Uh, read your Cirrus Purchase Agreement. Sections 8 and 9 specifically release Cirrus from any liability, by negligence theory or otherwise, due to any manf. defect of either the plane or the BRS system. Of course, the suit will still go forward, but Cirrus will claim the owner released them of liability, even if the plane was defective, by executing the purchase agreement and then by actually taking delivery of and flying the plane.

I would agree that there are probably some manuevers that could create a spin without rudder input. Eg, a sudden roll to level from a hard bank might create a skid, followed by a pullup to stall. I’ve also wondered whether the Lancair rudder limiter could interfere with the ability to recover from a spin. Anyone have any thoughts on that?