Strictly to keep the facts straight: There were four attempts. Two failed, two succeeded.
Strickly to keep the facts straight: there were 3 randomly selected planes, each was tested once and only 1 succeeded. The 2nd test on the plane was no longer a random sample but a test of a repair that caused the plane to fail. It is not part of the original analysis. I have every faith that Cirrus can make every chute work after enough fixes and retries, but only the first try counts as a reliability test.
Strickly to keep the facts straight: there were 3 randomly selected planes, each was tested once and only 1 succeeded.
Art,
Actually, N109CD wasnât randomly chosen, as far as I know â it was chosen as a logical candidate for a first test (type of airplane, time in service, type of SBs performed, etc.).
However, I will no longer argue with you on the facts - you win!
Mike, what I took issue with was the positive tone of your report on what was essentially a negative outcome. For example:
âAside from now having a TON more confidence that the system works (after the literal and figurative kinks are gone), I feel really good knowing what to do if I ever really need to pull that handle.â
To me that sounded a lot like âNo problem here, Guys. Relax.â
I stand by my post that:
The design is flawed.
The system is overly complicated and not fault-tolerant enough for an effective survival system.
All of these negative comments seem to presuppose that Cirrus is now done with the issue. I think they are just starting a process of a comprehensive analysis of the problem, and I fully expect that design changes and future SBs will ensue.
Their response has been almost unbelievably swift and open. If you at this juncture feel the 'chute isnât reliable enough for you to fly your airplane, fine. Stay on the ground, or go fly something else (which of course will have a 0% chance of successful 'chute deployment). And donât forget to disable the airbags in your car, because they are not 100% effective, either.
But recognize that they are not finished with this issue by a long shot! In (software) defect management, this would just be step 2 (verification of problem). Still to come are steps to fix the problem, verification that the fix addresses the problem, and dissemination of the fix.
Mike, what I took issue with was the positive tone of your report on what was essentially a negative outcome. For example:
âAside from now having a TON more confidence that the system works (after the literal and figurative kinks are gone), I feel really good knowing what to do if I ever really need to pull that handle.â
To me that sounded a lot like âNo problem here, Guys. Relax.â
I stand by my post that:
The design is flawed.
The system is overly complicated and not fault-tolerant enough for an effective survival system.
Joe,
Viva lâdifference!
I wasnât trying to present an overly positive tone. I do have a ton more confidence âknowing what to do if I ever really need to pull that handleâ - with the caveat as stated⌠âafter the literal and figurative kinks are goneâ. In fact, there IS a problem, guys⌠and we should not relax until itâs fixed⌠and those most in a position to do something about it, are working hard at it - 7x24 - to get it resolved. Until this IS resolved, I make my decision to fly my airplane with full knowledge that my 'chute may not function as expected - or at all - until this problem is resolved. I do so and still feel much safer than I would in any other airplane type I have personally flown (so I donât include multi-engined jets, for example). And I certainly donât plan on practicing any incipient spins in the near future. Iâm confident in my ability to avoid unintentional spins. I do what I can to avoid other risks, such as midair collisions, etc.
Personally, I wouldnât fault anyone who chooses NOT to fly, based on their perception of increased risk - because of this, or any, issue. That is every pilotâs prerogative and responsibility.
I know that Cirrus agrees that the system is flawed, and must be fixed. As to whether it is overly complicated⌠my own opinion is that the design itself is a lot simpler than many, and certainly in the category of âsimple enough to have a reasonable expectation of reliabilityâ. Clearly, though, something unexpected happened in the execution - probably the cable routing - and that has made the thing more cumbersome than it should be. I am as anxious as anyone else to hear how this will be addressed, because after all, the CAPS was among my (many) reasons for choosing to buy a Cirrus aircraft in the first place.
Paul,
In the NTSB prelim report it said that the SB 20-95-02 hadnât been applied to your plane yet. So your plane didnât have the benefit of the force-reducing mod that had been applied to the factory test aircraft.
-Curt
NTSB prelim report excerpt: On February 28, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued SB 20-95-02, after it was discovered that some production airplanes may exhibit a condition where the pull force required to activate the CAPS system may by greater than desired. The SB entailed the installation of a clamp to positively restrain the cable housing at the CAPS Handle Adapter, loosen and straighten the activation cable above the headliner, and to remove an Adel clamp securing the activation cable adjacent to the rocket cone adapter.The accident airplane had been operated for about 150 hours since new. On March 4, 2002, maintenance was performed on the airplane which included compliance with SB 22-95-01/AD 2002-05-05. Service Bulletin 20-95-02, had not been complied with at the time of the accident. [\i]
I think weâre missing the point. Of course the results, when viewed statistically were disappointing. Anything under 100% would be. But, itâs only relevant if itâs predictive, and of course itâs not predictive for the long run because changes will be made.
Of course the current planes have questionable CAPS reliability. Tell me something I donât already know.
The question of the hour, in my opinion, is whether CD is doing what is necessary to resolve the issue, and are they being forthcoming. If the answer to both is yes, which I believe it is, we are clearly and quickly on the road to the reliability everyone wants.
All of these negative comments seem to presuppose that Cirrus is now done with the issue. I think they are just starting a process of a comprehensive analysis of the problem, and I fully expect that design changes and future SBs will ensue.
Gordon, I agree completely. Itâs just that the upbeat and positive tone of Mikeâs report seemed to me out of sync with the negative outcome of the tests. Now that I read his post more carefully I see that hidden among all the optimism is the implication that Cirrus is not done with this. Good.
Their response has been almost unbelievably swift and open. If you at this juncture feel the 'chute isnât reliable enough for you to fly your airplane, fine. Stay on the ground, or go fly something else (which of course will have a 0% chance of successful 'chute deployment). And donât forget to disable the airbags in your car, because they are not 100% effective, either.
This is what I mean by Cirrus apologists. Many Cirrus owners bought the plane precisely because of the 'chute. The argument that a Cirrus with an unreliable chute is no worse than a plane with no 'chute at all is, frankly, quite beside the point.
But recognize that they are not finished with this issue by a long shot! In (software) defect management, this would just be step 2 (verification of problem). Still to come are steps to fix the problem, verification that the fix addresses the problem, and dissemination of the fix.
Again, fine. But that was not the thought I took away from Mikeâs report.
It is a sad commentary on our times when there are so many accolades for a company that is just doing the right thing, correcting a serious life/safety design problem in a product they make. The tone of the many comments suggest that most companies would try to hide the problem or delay the necessary repairs because of cost or marketing considerations. Cirrus is doing exactly what a buyer should expect any reputable company to do. There is no need to applaud their actions for doing what is right.
Thanks for being the âeyesâ of COPA. Nice report. Cirrus is a great company and they will address the chute issues. Do you have any more photos to post. Would like to see them all.
âThere is no need to applaud their actions for doing what is right.â
Au contraire! I commend my kids for doing the right thing and I think CD should be commended as well. Yes it is a sad commentary that some companies do not embrace the âdo the right thingâ philosophy. Letâs see, Ford, Firestone, Enron, Arthur Anderson, Tyco, Texaco, Microsoft, Global Crossing and Qwest just to name a few obvious and well reported fiascos.
I would definitely buy another plane from them over any other company, if I was in the position to do so. Since Iâm not, Iâll applaud their actions. Hopefully, the rest of the industry will take notice.
If you read my other posts, you will see that I strongly believe that more analysis, repair and testing IS required, but I have great confidence in the outcome.
No apologies, just sincere opinions. I still love my SR22 and have about 5 cross country trips planned over the next 6 weeks. I feel more comfortable in this plane than any other (piston) GA plane Iâve flown in.
It is a sad commentary on our times when there are so many accolades for a company that is just doing the right thingâŚ
I agree with that. With due respect to the members of the bar out there, I lay the blame for this squarely on the tort system, class-action lawsuits, and the litigious society we live in.
This also goes to show that those who defend the current system on the basis that it somehow promotes safer and better products are dead wrong. Cirrus responded because their current and future customers demanded and deserved a response and action and, I believe, also because it was ethically the right thing to do. If they had done the âright thingâ according to the lawyers, all you would have at this point is a terse statement to the press, if that.
In this environment, a company that steps up and says âwe have a problem hereâ absolutely does deserve accolades. The fact that this is so unusual should serve to awaken us to the extent of how warped our world has become.
While I agree with you about the sad state of affairs, I think Cirrusâ actions ARE praiseworthy. What a depressing world it would be if no one ever received positive reinforcement for âdoing what is right.â For one thing, no puppies would ever get housebroken!
Cirrus is not the first aircraft manufacturer to have problems in the field with a new design. When Cessna first came out with their turboprop twin, the Conquest, they had a leeeetle problem with flutter in the empennage section that caused at least one in-flight failure with a fatality.
A better example would be the Bonanza V-tails. Beechcraft was (and in many circles, still is) a highly-regarded company. Yet, when doctors started killing themselves by tearing off the tails, Beech âhandledâ the problem by stating that the pilots were flying the airplanes in an unsafe fashion! Only after more accidents occurred did Beech come out with modifications to strengthen the tail.
You should wish that all of your business dealings could be with folks as honest and forthright as the K brothers.
Gordon, I couldnât agree more. In fact our current tort system encourages obfuscation in the hope that it will insulate one from liability. If all companies were open and honest it would be a much better (and probably safer) society.
Mike, youâre using logical math, and Art is using cup half empty math. Of course thereâs a difference.
Andy
Andy,
Actually, though I donât share Artâs general dislike of the Cirrus, I do have to agree with his math.
Of the 3 tests on non-modified planes that Cirrus performed, 2 of them failed.
Of the one known deployment attempt in the field, 1 of 1 failed.
So that means that 3 of 4 attempts failed, using planes that currently meet all SBs, ADs, and SAs. In other words, except for the very newest planes (with the straightforward routing of the cable), none of the other planes currently flying have ever demonstrated a successful CAPS deployment. The oldest 14 have known bad brackets. The newer (but not newest) planes could not be activated by the test subject.
I certainly join all the others here saying that Cirrus is doing a great job in being upfront and honest with their test methodology and results, and I trust that they will work to find a solution.
However, the really important point for all of us current SR2x pilots to keep in mind is that the parachute does not seem to work, except for the newest planes. How that affects each PICâs decision making is up to that individual pilot. But I just donât want this important point to be drowned out in the bickering about statistics and whether Cirrus is doing the right thing (which I think they are).
Steve, I think you have a valid point. I made a separate post, where I indicated that my view is that there are problems with the chute - the testing made me feel an optimism that there would be a good resolution.
I do have to say that one area that concerns me is that if the newer planes have an improved cable routing, why wasnât it implemented on the older planes? Iâd expect that to be part of the upcoming info that comes forward.