Prelim report is out:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20050222X00211&key=1
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I hate to ask but alot if not all the sr-22’s accidents seem to be pilot error? Are these guys getting into stuff they shouldn’t be in? It seems they all get inot weather or whatever the reason and just lose it. Is training doing it’s job for the aircraft?
The simple, unvarnished, going to make everybody mad because its a truth they don’t want to admit to, is this:
The personality type that makes an individual aggressive and assertive enough to become rich enough to buy a 1/2 million dollar airplane also makes them the absolute worst personality type for being allowed to fly an airplane. They display 4 out of 5 of the FAA’s psychological warning signs: Anti-authority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, and Macho.
These people don’t need any more training in the aircraft, they need EXTENSIVE BASIC TRAINING in aeronautical decision making so they know when a flight is simply out-of-bounds logistically, mechanically, or physiologically. They need behavior modification therapy so that they become capable of recognition and self-assessment and suppresion of their hazardous attitudes. They need critical decision-making skills to know when a flight is beyond their own personal abilities, even though another pilot in the same aircraft might make the flight successfully. (There is a LOT of “If he can do, then by-god, so can I!” going on in this group.
In reply to:
I hate to ask but alot if not all the sr-22’s accidents seem to be pilot error? Are these guys getting into stuff they shouldn’t be in?
I think you are right-on in your assessment. A lot of discussion about this is going on in the member forum, but the quick summary is that Cirrus pilots seem to be making the same mistakes that have been killing pilots for decades.
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Is training doing it’s job for the aircraft?
Unfortunately, training can teach the basics about flying any aircraft, but it is much harder to instill consistently good judgment in a pilot.
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The simple, unvarnished, going to make everybody mad because its a truth they don’t want to admit to, is this:
The personality type that makes an individual aggressive and assertive enough to become rich enough to buy a 1/2 million dollar airplane also makes them the absolute worst personality type for being allowed to fly an airplane. They display 4 out of 5 of the FAA’s psychological warning signs: Anti-authority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, and Macho.
These people don’t need any more training in the aircraft, they need EXTENSIVE BASIC TRAINING in aeronautical decision making so they know when a flight is simply out-of-bounds logistically, mechanically, or physiologically. They need behavior modification therapy so that they become capable of recognition and self-assessment and suppresion of their hazardous attitudes. They need critical decision-making skills to know when a flight is beyond their own personal abilities, even though another pilot in the same aircraft might make the flight successfully. (There is a LOT of “If he can do, then by-god, so can I!” going on in this group.
I am an active member of COPA and developed the Critical Decision Making course that we conduct across the country.
While I agree with your comment about type A people and there is a lot of them that own Cirri, Bonanzas, Lancairs and Mooneys, lets not accuse the whole group of Cirrus owners for the sometimes poor actions of others.
We are having an active discussion on this topic on the members side of this forum, you should check it out. You will find many that share a good portion of your thoughts.
85% of ALL GA accidents are pilot error. It ain’t the plane if it was the problem would be much easier to solve.
Fly Safe
Mason
In reply to:
The simple, unvarnished, going to make everybody mad because its a truth they don’t want to admit to, is this:
The personality type that makes an individual aggressive and assertive enough to become rich enough to buy a 1/2 million dollar airplane also makes them the absolute worst personality type for being allowed to fly an airplane. They display 4 out of 5 of the FAA’s psychological warning signs: Anti-authority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, and Macho.
These people don’t need any more training in the aircraft, they need EXTENSIVE BASIC TRAINING in aeronautical decision making so they know when a flight is simply out-of-bounds logistically, mechanically, or physiologically. They need behavior modification therapy so that they become capable of recognition and self-assessment and suppresion of their hazardous attitudes. They need critical decision-making skills to know when a flight is beyond their own personal abilities, even though another pilot in the same aircraft might make the flight successfully. (There is a LOT of “If he can do, then by-god, so can I!” going on in this group.
Good thing that this organization, the Cirrus Owner’s and Pilots Association, has taken the lead in doing just what you suggest. COPA participated in the FAA study on Technologically Advanced Aircraft, seeking to understand what happened in fatal accidents involving airplanes that had GPS navigation with multifunction displays and lots of advanced avionics. COPA created a Critical Decision Making seminar series to address personal minimums and criteria for assessing risks while planning and flying cross-country trips. COPA expanded the Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program with a scenario-based workshop on single pilot risk management.
The unvarnished truth doesn’t make everybody mad. It also prompted action. And COPA admits bad decision-making happens. So we work to fix that.
Now, if you have a suggestion for how to ensure that all pilots undergo such training, then we can work on that too.
Cheers
Rick
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They display 4 out of 5 of the FAA’s psychological warning signs: Anti-authority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, and Macho.
Which trait are we missing?
How safe would you feel if only 10% of accidents were caused by pilot errors?
IOW, if in 90% of the accidents it was the PLANE’s fault?
I’d reconsider this whole flying business if I thought the PLANE was likely to kill ME (instead of the other way around!)
good point, but the two in Florida raise some questions
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I’d reconsider this whole flying business if I thought the PLANE was likely to kill ME (instead of the other way around!)
100% agreed! I would have taken up boating a long time ago. [:)]
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good point, but the two in Florida raise some questions
Frank,
I agree with you to a certain extent, but the thing about the Flordia accidents is that–speaking hypothetically since the final results are not in–having some water mess with your pitot-static system or even losing your entire PFD is no excuse for losing control of an airplane.
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I agree with you to a certain extent, but the thing about the Florida accidents is that–speaking hypothetically since the final results are not in–having some water mess with your pitot-static system or even losing your entire PFD is no excuse for losing control of an airplane.
Andy,
Taking the opposite side, however, static air blockage is real trouble, since it is a single point of failure which affects both the PFD Airspeed, Altitude, and VSI, and also the backup Airspeed and Altitude. Furthermore, it affects the PDF and backup instruments in (presumably) the same way, so they agree with each other (although wrong) in a cross-check. That leaves only the attitude indicators correct, traditionally the least reliable of the gages.
Static air blockage cannot be checked on the ground, and manifests itself after takeoff, in this case as you enter IMC.
I am more sympathetic with the resultant confusion.
I expect:
- Cirrus to move the alternate static air control to a more prominent position, near the gages
- The PFDs to be improved to also sample the alternate static air, and automatically issue a message and/or revert to alternate static air when alternate and primary static air disagree.
In reply to:
Taking the opposite side, however, static air blockage is real trouble, since it is a single point of failure which affects both the PFD Airspeed, Altitude, and VSI, and also the backup Airspeed and Altitude. Furthermore, it affects the PDF and backup instruments in (presumably) the same way, so they agree with each other (although wrong) in a cross-check.
Warren,
The thing with static blockage is that you tend to see bouncing and wildly erratic instruments initially, and presumably (although I really don’t know) this would be happening on the PFD and your backup instruments which should immediately indicate that you try the alternate static air. Assuming you are correct, however, that is a very good point.
Additionally, I was trying to keep up with posts on the Member’s forum, so I cut my post kind of short. I should have also stated that, while I believe that a pitot static incident (especially if it is solved by switching to the alternate static source) or PFD failure by themselves should not be a reason to lose control of the aircraft, I can understand why pilots do lose control. System failures, especially for someone that is not used to them, can very quickly become overwhelming.
I have often thought of the issue of a static port blockage. GPS units are theoretically capable of warning about this. They have a connection to the static port, and they know the GPS altitude. If the baro altitude and the GPS altitude differ by a significant amount, it is likely a blocked static port.
I have always worried about flying along, straight and level, in IFR conditions. If the static port gets plugged, what would be first warning sign. If you start to drift slowly downward, it appears to me that the first warning sign would be the crunch as you hit the ground.
Laurie
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Warren,
The thing with static blockage is that you tend to see bouncing and wildly erratic instruments initially, and presumably (although I really don’t know) this would be happening on the PFD and your backup instruments which should immediately indicate that you try the alternate static air. Assuming you are correct, however, that is a very good point.
Additionally, I was trying to keep up with posts on the Member’s forum, so I cut my post kind of short. I should have also stated that, while I believe that a pitot static incident (especially if it is solved by switching to the alternate static source) or PFD failure by themselves should not be a reason to lose control of the aircraft, I can understand why pilots do lose control. System failures, especially for someone that is not used to them, can very quickly become overwhelming.
Would it be safer to always use alternate static during takeoff? No concern about readings jumping around at a critical point in the flight. You could learn to compensate for the slight error introduced.
Gaynor
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Which trait are we missing?
This latest icing accident makes me re-think my previous criticism of the pilots who pulled their shoots.
Although have I never posted or commented publicly about the Florida, or previous Canadian(?) incidents I had previously thought the pilots had given up a bit too soon. I can see now how this was an incorrect way of thinking. If you loose control of the airplane, you may not have much time before it exceeds the maximum parachute deployment speed.
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I have always worried about flying along, straight and level, in IFR conditions. If the static port gets plugged, what would be first warning sign. If you start to drift slowly downward, it appears to me that the first warning sign would be the crunch as you hit the ground.
Laurie
On a descent with a blocked static line, the airspeed indicator would indicate increasingly faster than actual airspeed due to the relatively low static pressure trapped in the system.
I believe it is rare to have static ports blocked at altitude; more common is water entering the ports (or condensed in the lines) on the ground.
In such cases, air can bubble around the water, causing the needles to jump around (adding to the confusion).
Although you are (almost) always in radar contact IFR, the controller can only monitor your altitude reported by the transponder, which also uses the static pressure, and would also be affected (as is the autopilot).
I don’t believe the typical panel mount GPS is attached to static air, however the PFDs are, and I agree that PFDs can/should compare the static pressure to the GPS indicated altitudes, and warn of unexplained differences.
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I have always worried about flying along, straight and level, in IFR conditions.
If you have a TAWS system, then the warning would be, “Terrain!! Terrain!!”. One more reason why I think TAWS is a better investment than Skywatch.
BTW, are you the author of Copilot for palm devices? It is my favorite aviation app.
In reply to:
I have always worried about flying along, straight and level, in IFR conditions. If the static port gets plugged, what would be first warning sign. If you start to drift slowly downward, it appears to me that the first warning sign would be the crunch as you hit the ground.
Laurie,
Not to say it couldn’t or hasn’t happened, but I don’t know off-hand of an accident that was caused by an enroute static blockage. Lots of them in the departure phase. Typically, you should see the needles start jumping around at first which would be an indication to try the alternate static source.
I’ve had my static and pitot ports freeze over before, while in nighttime IMC (windshield frosted over at the same time, and rime began accumulating on leading edges). As for the ports, the first indication is a feeling: “something’s screwy here!”. I simply flipped on the alternate static port and hit the pitot heater. You need to do that immediately, BEFORE spending the time trying to remember…does my airspeed appear to increase or decrease with a frozen port? You’ll immediately recognize something is acting screwy on the port instruments, so just go immediately to heat and alternate port. If you don’t have an alternate port…you should get one installed. Lot cheaper than breaking the glass on the climb indicator (which can also serve as an alternate in an emergency)