In that case we’re on exactly the same wavelength, Stuart, and I am certain that this is indeed what Cirrus will end up doing. It clearly will take a little more time to arrange than the tests today, though. My guess is that they will use the production plane they took off the assembly line for the ground test, since it’s going to need the chute replaced anyway.
I don’t know how they could have a cut away system, and still have it be a “normal” plane. The early test models had the CAPS mounted on the roof exterior, as I recall.
Andy
In reply to:
The only difference is that they would now use a production plane with all the new CAPS modifications. … My concern is with the activation system, not the CAPS concept itself.
I don’t see any need for an in-flight test to test the activation system. They already did an in-flight test of the 'chute itself. It works. The process of activating the rocket can be (and apparently has been) tested on terra firma without endangering a test pilot.
I thought it was more than replacing the chute. Aren’t the straps for the chute imbedded in the fuselage requiring some major bodywork? Was the test made with the straps disconnected? Maybe I should just wait
for Mike’s report.
Walt N224AZ
In reply to:
I don’t see any need for an in-flight test to test the activation system. They already did an in-flight test of the 'chute itself. It works. The process of activating the rocket can be (and apparently has been) tested on terra firma without endangering a test pilot.
I agree. The whole question was how and whether it would fire. The question was asked and answered by the tests. Cirrus was wise to run the test - and that answered all the doubts and questions about it firing… Performing the test at altitude proves nothing else since the issue was activating the system, not seeing it perform again.
Yes, the harness is embedded in channels in the fiberglass. I would not have thought the rocket alone would pull the harness out, but it would have to be removed to replace the chute, which is why I suggested it would make sense to use that plane for an in-flight test, with cut-away provision. And then…
For sale: one near-new SR20 - rocket fired 5 times, otherwise only slightly used.
…I agree. The whole question was how and whether it would fire. The question was asked and answered by the tests. Cirrus was wise to run the test - and that answered all the doubts and questions about it firing… Performing the test at altitude proves nothing else since the issue was activating the system, not seeing it perform again…
You all must have received a different letter than me. My letter said 2 out of the three deployments failed. Only on a brand new airplane, never subjected to flight loads, did the parachute deploy on the first attempt.
In reply to:
You all must have received a different letter than me. My letter said 2 out of the three deployments failed. Only on a brand new airplane, never subjected to flight loads, did the parachute deploy on the first attempt.
Perhaps I did… I just re-read mine, and I can’t find that. Anyway, I can tell you that in there were four tests done while I was there. Brief summary is:
Test 1 - bracket failed on N109CD
Test 2 - N174CD - Friction deemed too high for Cindy. (Paul Johnston was in the airplane, and could have pulled the handle, but Alan wanted Cindy to be able to do it).
Test 3 - Cindy successfully activated on repaired N109CD - relatively old SR20; date stamp on BRS riser was 6/22/98
Test 4 - New SR22, not flown; Temp tail N64X. I pulled the handle. Successful deployment.
Still leaves the question of why friction was too high in N174CD, which was current on SBs. When I left, Engineering was working on the solution, which may have something to do with a sort of “position memory” in the cable - i.e. a rerouted cable may not necessarily conform to the new routing, tending instead to take up it’s old shape (strictly my interpretation). I imagine that we’ll see a fix of some sort fairly soon.
The bracket failure in N109CD is a problem – as I left, I believe they were working on the SB to change that on the 14 (well, 13 now) affected airplanes.
As I edit this, I just caught your post that the 3rd test doesn’t count. Perhaps you’re right - my take was that it was very important to confirm that the repair worked. Also, it is possible that the 'chute could have been deployed even in that test. The bracket that failed holds the entire handle assembly to the “ceiling”; it seemed that it could still be fired holding the assembly with one hand and pulling the T-handle with the other. They elected to stop that test at that point - the attitude seemed to be “not working properly is not good enough”.
Everyone was disappointed by the failure, but was happy to have found - and have the opportunity to correct - a flaw.
- MIke.
Well, here I go again…
You guys are amazing! Except for Don and Art you’re willing to accept anything from Cirrus! Look, guys, the first two tests after a real-life failure FAILED. Period. End of story for this particular design. The statistical significance of one good test is NIL. This design is just plain flawed.
And I’m sure that in an emergency I would calmly remove a velcro cover, remove a safety pin, pull a T handle once to get the proper slack, them carefully align the T fore and aft, and then hope I have enough strength and pull at the proper angle to make it all work.
This Rube Goldberg setup simply does not pass muster as a reliable survival system.
I agree whole-heartedly that CD is doing the right thing and being extremely up-front with the results. My perhaps overly emotional response was to what seems to be a prevailing sentiment in several threads that the definitive tests were done and the system worked.
A more accurate assessment would seem to be, preliminary tests were done and problems were identified. Solutions are being developed, and soon the system will work as expected because CD is committed to doing the right thing. Still very laudible praise is due CD. Let’s not reach the conclusion that the system works—yet. I have no doubt that it will. And I am still counting the days til I get my plane
As I understand it the Velcro cover and pin are supposed to be pulled before flight. I see no unusual maneuvers needed to activate the system after that. I do feel that a training mock-up has always been needed and now that seems to have been addressed. I would have never gotten back into GA if it were not for this airplane. The CAPS played a huge roll in my decision to buy a Cirrus, so I took the problems very seriously. I feel CD has responded quickly and appropriately. My confidence has been restored. It seem as if some folks wont be satisfied unless every airplane is taken off the assembly line, flown to altitude, the chute fired, cut away, the airplane then returned and rebuilt. At times I wonder if that would be sufficient. Mike
In reply to:
Well, here I go again…
You guys are amazing! Except for Don and Art you’re willing to accept anything from Cirrus! Look, guys, the first two tests after a real-life failure FAILED. Period. End of story for this particular design. The statistical significance of one good test is NIL.
In reply to:
This design is just plain flawed.
And I’m sure that in an emergency I would calmly remove a velcro cover, pull a T handle once to get the proper slack, them carefully align the T fore and aft, and then hope I have enough strength and pull at the proper angle to make it all work.
This Rube Goldberg setup simply does not pass muster as a reliable survival system.
Joe,
First, with regard to being willing to accept anything from Cirrus… a whole bunch of folks there know otherwise. Like most companies, they have positives and negatives. However, no company I’ve ever dealt with has been as honest as this company is; it seems to be an unwritten (or maybe written) rule that above all, be honest.
With regard to the tests – I don’t recall anyone saying that the first two tests didn’t fail; nor that it was statistically significant that two tests passed. I believe that Cirrus would agree with you that this is the “End of stroy for this particular design”; they’re clearly devoted to changing it so that it works reliably, in every reasonable statistical sense. So, if you count making changes to a design - so that it works the way the designers intended, every time – as the “End of stroy for this particular design”, then yes, I believe it is.
Besides, what to do?
- Not test.
- Lie about the test.
- Gather data, be scientific, be open about the findings, fix what’s wrong.
From everything I’ve seen, path # 3 is being followed.
Perhaps my fault for describing, as I did, each tiny movement in the process. However, pulling the handle is no more difficult than opening a door, as long as you know how to do it. As an example, I recall a perplexing moment trying to figure out how to flush a toilet in Istanbul. The mechanism is different from what I’m used to - a lift-and-turn arrangement. It was no worse, no better, no more “Rube Goldberg” than the flush mechanisms we use here, but it was different.
My point is that the CAPS release mechanism is EASY, although I don’t believe it’s been described well enough in the printed material we’ve seen so far. Better photos or drawings, videos, and best of all, the opportunity to try one in a simulator, will pretty much solve the problem of the perceived difficulty of using the system.
As for not passing muster as a reliable survival system, you’re certainly welcome to your opinion, which differs completely from mine on this score.
- Mike.
In reply to:
My perhaps overly emotional response was to what seems to be a prevailing sentiment in several threads that the definitive tests were done and the system worked.
Michael,
You won’t find anyone in Cirrus who’s satisfied with the status quo right now. I agree with your comment that “A more accurate assessment would seem to be, preliminary tests were done and problems were identified. Solutions are being developed, and soon the system will work as expected because CD is committed to doing the right thing.”.
One thing that may have gotten lost in all of this (probably because I didn’t say it) is that the current production uses a completely different (and apparently much better) routing of the cable. I looked at it; it’s stone-simple. The more complicated routings (which according to my understanding are those that are likely to present problems) are in older airplanes - not sure how old, how many, etc… we’ll have to wait for data from the company on that.
Good luck with your airplane!
Mike.
I have drawn four conclusions from the tests:
- The new aircraft, ones that have been delivered over the last few weeks and all future deliveries, have an effective and reasonably proven system.
- All existing aircraft (Through the latest change in design) MAY have problems and further refinement and testing is required. Owners of these aircraft should be reasonably assured that the bracket will hold (apparently an issue through SR20 #14 only) and that the cable will pull with reasonable force. At this time, it seems as thought additional fixes are required to achieve this level of assurance.
- Cirrus Design is working proactively, openly and honestly to design and retrofit (or fix) an improved system into all existing aircraft. Their efforts, to date, have been exemplary and have earned the benefit of the doubt going forward.
- The tests were very worthwhile. They have proven the the CAPS, as being currently installed, is effective and reliable. Furthermore, the tests have uncovered some potential weaknesses in older aircraft, which need further investigation, probably fixes and tests.
Marty